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MUTUAL FUNDS AND THE REGULATORY
CAPTURE OF THE SEC 
Stewart L. Brown, Ph.D., CFA* 
Regulatory agencies are created to act in the public interest but often 
end up acting in the interests of those regulated.  This is known as 
regulatory capture.  The mutual fund industry is the custodian of massive 
levels of wealth of the investing public and is regulated by the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“the SEC”).  Mutual fund assets are currently in 
the neighborhood of $16 trillion and these assets generate revenues in 
excess of $100 billion per year for the firms that manage mutual funds.  
The investment management industry is incentivized to influence the 
regulators by whatever means available to maximize profits for their 
owners.  This paper documents how the investment management industry 
has captured the SEC in certain key policy areas.  As a result, the industry 
is able to siphon off billions of dollars per year in excessive and often 
hidden fees.  The SEC has within its power to unilaterally blunt the worse 
abuses if it were willing to act in the public interest. 
 *  Emeritus Professor of Finance, Florida State University, B.S.B.A., 1970; M.B.A., 
1971; Ph.D., 1974, University of Florida; CFA.  The author is grateful to John Freeman, 
David Rasmussen, and Mary McCormick for assistance on earlier drafts of this paper.  
Remaining mistakes are the sole responsibility of the author. 
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INTRODUCTION
Mutual fund assets currently total about $16 trillion.1  The companies 
that manage mutual funds collect more than $100 billion per year in fees.2
At present, about ninety million investors own mutual funds3 that are 
theoretically highly regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.4  One of the principal missions of the SEC is to protect 
investors.5  Regulatory agencies, created to act in the public interest, often 
 1.  Trends in Mutual Fund Investing December 2016, INV. CO. INST.,
https://www.ici.org/research/stats/trends/trends_12_16 [https://perma.cc/BA7N-9M38] (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2017). 
 2.  Morningstar, Inc. did a fee study in 2015, where it found that the asset weighted 
expense ratio across all funds was 0.64%.  Multiplying 0.0064 times $16 trillion yields 
annual amounts paid to the investment management industry of $104 billion.  Michael 
Rawson & Ben Johnson, 2015 Fee Study: Investors Are Driving Expense Ratios Down,
MORNINGSTAR 1 (Mar. 12, 2015), https://news.morningstar.com/pdfs/2015_fee_study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7LC4-7G3A]. 
 3.  Id.
 4.  17 C.F.R. § 270 (1940). 
 5.  About the SEC: What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013),
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end up acting directly or indirectly in the interests of those they regulate.  
This concept of “Regulatory Capture” is rooted in the economics and 
political science literature. George Stigler, in his “Theory of Economic 
Regulation,” argued that, “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”6  He discusses how 
firms in regulated industries often use regulation to restrict entry and earn 
monopoly profits.7
Stigler, a Nobel Laureate, observed that the government’s special 
resource is the power to coerce,8 and interest groups that can convince the 
government to use its coercive power for their benefit can earn economic 
rents at the expense of others.9  Stigler was influenced by the public choice 
theories advanced by Mancur Olson.10  A principal insight of Olson in his 
“The Logic of Collective Action” is that some groups have a larger impact 
on government policies than others.11  In a democratic system, people with 
common interests generally will band together to achieve common goals.12
However, if the benefits of a political outcome are concentrated in the 
hands of a few and the costs are diffused among many, the beneficiaries are 
motivated to influence the political process in their favor.13  At the same 
time, those who bear the costs have little incentive to organize to protect 
their interests.14
The mutual fund industry offers a textbook illustration of Olson’s 
insights.  It has been observed that the investment management industry 
overcharges investors by about $35 billion annually in the form of excess 
advisory fees.15  If this observation is correct, the $35 billion is spread 
among ninety million investors so that on average each investor pays about 
$400 per year in excess fees.  Yet the fifty largest investment management 
firms would each benefit by about $588 million per year.16  Certainly, the 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/VU78-TZ6X]. 
 6.  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971). 
 7.  Id. at 5. 
 8.  Id. at 4. 
 9.  Id.
 10.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 11.  See id. at 3, 127-28 (“[S]mall ‘special interest’ groups, the ‘vested interests’ have 
disproportionate power. . . . The privileged and intermediate groups often triumph over the 
numerically superior forces in the latent or large groups because the former are generally 
organized and active while the latter are normally unorganized and inactive.”). 
 12.  Id. at 5. 
 13.  Id. at 3. 
 14.  Id. at 165-66. 
 15.  Stewart Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity, 16 
J. BUS. & SEC. L. 329, 399-400 (2016). 
 16.  Based on information from Morningstar Direct (a proprietary database service of 
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motivation exists for the investment management industry to capture the 
SEC.  Capture, in this case, is an especially pernicious outcome because 
small cost increments subtracted from the accounts of millions of 
individual investors have a large impact when compounded over long time 
periods. 
This paper presents compelling evidence that the SEC has been 
effectively captured by the mutual fund industry.  At the same time, the 
agency may be partially exonerated from blame because some of the 
important examples of capture illustrated were imposed on it by external 
factors, which are generally associated with political intrusion into the 
regulatory process. 
This paper is divided into seven parts.  Part I explores the literature on 
regulatory capture.  Part II discusses the revolving door between the SEC 
and the financial and investment management industry.  Part III explores 
characteristics of mutual fund investors whom the SEC is pledged to 
protect.  In Part IV, the paper presents examples of forces external to the 
SEC that have resulted in excessive and hidden fees on the assets of mutual 
fund investors.  Part V examines regulatory outcomes imposed directly by 
the SEC and how they demonstrate clear deference to the investment 
management industry.  Finally, Part VI details the failure of comprehensive 
mutual fund reform in 2004, and Part VII summarizes the paper and makes 
recommendations to correct some of the most egregious shortcomings of 
the SEC’s regulatory regime. 
I. REGULATORY CAPTURE
A. Capture as a Continuum 
The Stigler analysis of regulatory capture, developed in the early 
1970s, tended to see capture as an all-or-nothing proposition effectively 
capturing most regulated industries.17  A more recent and sophisticated 
analysis tends to see capture as a continuum.  Daniel Carpenter and David 
A. Moss explored the concept, defining regulatory capture as “the result or 
process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or 
Morningstar, Inc.) and some data calculations from it, the fifty largest firms controlled about 
84% of mutual fund assets.  See generally Alina Lamy, Morningstar DirectSM U.S. Asset 
Flows Update, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 15, 2016), http://corporate.morningstar.com 
/US/documents/AssetFlows/AssetFlowsJan2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC34-WGJF] 
(presenting various numerical data regarding U.S. asset flows through the end of 2015).  So, 
84% of $35 billion divided by 50 yields an average of $588 million in excess fees per firm. 
 17.  Stigler, supra note 6, at 3. 
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repeatedly directed away from the public interest and towards the interests 
of the regulated industry, by the action or intent of the industry itself.”18
They find that: 
The regulatory world is one of shades of gray. Yet capture 
scholarship does not typically discriminate among these shades in 
ways that enable informed advice on the marginal value of 
regulatory (or deregulatory) policy options. . . . However, the 
essential idea is that policymakers are for sale, and that 
regulatory policy is largely purchased by those most interested 
and able to buy it, remains central to the literature.19
Carpenter and Moss differentiate between “strong” and “weak” 
capture:
Strong capture violates the public interest to such an extent that 
the public would be better served by either (a) no regulation of 
the activity in question . . . or (b) comprehensive replacement of 
the . . . agency in question. . . . Weak capture, by contrast, occurs 
when special interest influence compromises the capacity of 
regulation to enhance public interest, but the public is still being 
served by regulation, relative to the baseline of no regulation.20
Carpenter and Moss conclude that “although capture can (and does) 
take a range of forms, credible evidence of strong and/or pervasive capture 
is difficult to find, and we suspect that cases of both are quite rare.”21
Similarly, Dal Bó finds “(unfortunately scarce) evidence regarding the link 
between political influence and regulatory outcomes.”22
Neither Carpenter and Moss nor Dal Bó have examined the mutual 
fund industry, where trillions of invested dollars have invited a systematic 
violation of the public trust involving billions of dollars of excess and 
hidden fees per year.  Some of the evidence presented here is explicitly 
political in nature and neither subtle nor abstract.  Other evidence shows a 
consistent and pervasive bias in favor of the mutual fund industry and 
against the interests of the investing public. 
 18.  DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, EDS., PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE,
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 13 (2014).
 19.  Id. at 9. 
 20.  Id. at 11-12. 
 21.  Id. at 454. 
 22.  Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y
203, 216 (2006). 
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B. Broad and Narrow Regulatory Capture 
Carpenter and Moss define regulatory capture as the process by which 
regulation, “in law or application,” “is directed away from the public 
interest.”23  According to Dal Bó, regulatory capture may receive both a 
broad and narrow interpretation.  Broadly interpreted, regulatory capture is 
“the process through which special interests affect state intervention in any 
of its forms,” i.e., taxes, monetary policy, legislation, etc.24  Under a narrow 
interpretation, regulatory capture “is specifically the process through which 
regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state agencies that are 
supposed to control them.”25  Thus, under the broad interpretation, political 
influence may impact regulation because the legislature passes laws 
contrary to the public interest, which the agency must then interpret and 
administer.26  Similarly, under the narrow interpretation, regulators may 
interpret legislation in a manner contrary to the public interest.27  In what 
follows, the differentiation of broad and narrow capture holds up 
reasonably well but not perfectly.  In some cases, the distinction is blurred.  
Both forms are consistent with the Carpenter and Moss definition of 
regulatory capture, and the “shades of gray” mentioned by them are on full 
display. 
The broad regulatory capture documented here is overtly political in 
nature.  The industry achieves its goals by influencing politicians or 
political appointees in a manner harmful to the public interest.  The 
influence may involve shaping legislation to reduce or eliminate adverse 
regulation, or it may involve petitioning political appointees directly to 
achieve favorable outcomes.  In either case, the agency is effectively 
captured because it must act in the interest of the industry and agency 
personnel are prevented from acting in the public interest.  Broad capture is 
consistent with the Carpenter and Moss definition because the agency 
regulation or the lack thereof is directed away from the public interest by 
law or application. 
The examples of broad regulatory capture illustrated below are 
relatively straightforward and easy to identify.  The political pressure 
involved is explicit and unambiguous.  Narrow regulatory capture is 
different in that it is often ambiguous, difficult to identify with confidence, 
and also subject to the shades of gray mentioned by Carpenter and Moss.28
 23.  CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 18, at 13. 
 24.  Dal Bó, supra note 22, at 203.
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id. at 216. 
 27.  Id. at 211-13. 
 28.  CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 18, at 9. 
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The traditional notion of regulatory capture has the self-interest of the 
regulators as its primary motivation; however sometimes there are other 
factors that intervene to cloud the issue.  In regulatory settings, there is 
often a range of plausible disagreement concerning policy.  For instance, 
deregulation of the financial system pre-crisis had a plausible free market 
rationale.  It was only after the fact that it became clear regulatory errors 
were committed.29
Motivations other than just self-interest may cause regulators to favor 
industry at the expense of the public.  Kwak discusses cultural capture 
wherein regulators come to absorb the world view and narrative of the 
industry they regulate.  The mechanism has to do with several factors 
including identification with an in-group and perceived social, economic, 
and intellectual status of the regulated.  Finally, the development of 
personal relationships between the regulators and regulated may cause a 
conscious or unconscious bias in favor of regulated individuals and the 
industry that employs them.30
Potential employment of regulators in the regulated industry is a 
motivation for regulators to favor the regulated.  When present, it is clearly 
associated with the self-interest of the regulator. 
II. THE REVOLVING DOOR
The back-and-forth of SEC employees to and from the financial 
sector, not just the mutual fund industry, is massive.  The Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) has found that: 
[F]rom 2001 through 2010, 419 former SEC employees filed at 
least 1,949 disclosure statements saying they planned to represent 
clients or new employers in matters pending at the SEC. . . . The 
1,949 statements are just the tip of the iceberg, because former 
employees are only required to file them during the two-year 
period immediately after they leave the agency. POGO found that 
many former SEC employees have helped businesses get a break 
from the agency.31
 29.  See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE, SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 73 (Daniel 
Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2014) (explaining policies of deregulation that were 
favored pre-crisis by the financial sector to increase profits at the time but ultimately 
resulted in widespread loss). 
 30.  Id. at 77-78. 
 31.  Michael Smallberg, Dangerous Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC Creates Risk of 
Regulatory Capture, PROJECT ON GOV. OVERSIGHT 8 (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://pogoarchives.org/ebooks/20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolving-door.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6GZ-H7T7]. 
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The issue of former SEC employees attempting to influence the 
Commission on behalf of specific companies is a problem.  However, the 
impact of former employees on overall policy is potentially serious, if not 
catastrophic.  The POGO study illustrates a case in point: money market 
mutual funds. 
Mary L. Schapiro, then-chairman of the SEC, was concerned about the 
potential systematic destabilizing risk of money market funds to the 
financial system.  The genesis of this concern was the $300 billion run on 
money market funds during the 2008 financial crisis.32  Ms. Schapiro 
proposed regulations to reduce the risk but failed to call for a vote of the 
Commission because three of the five commissioners had stated their 
opposition.33
The opposition emerged because the SEC faced a barrage of lobbying 
activity on behalf of the money market industry by former SEC employees, 
including a former counsel to an SEC Commissioner and two former 
officials of the SEC Division of Investment Management.  One of these 
was General Counsel of the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and the 
other was president and CEO of the Mutual Fund Directors Forum.  Laura 
Unger, a former SEC Commissioner, also weighed in against the proposed 
regulation.34
The issue of new regulation of money market funds was finally 
decided when Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar weighed in against the 
proposed regulations.  Commissioner Aguilar had formerly been executive 
vice president of Invesco, a money management firm.  He had also worked 
as a corporate attorney where his practice involved representing mutual 
funds.35  Former SEC Chairman Levett called the SEC Money Fund punt a 
“National Disgrace.”36
 32.  Id. at 3; see Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony 
on Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms (June 21, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/Testimony/Detail/Testimony/1365171489510 
[https://perma.cc/D3M5-C2SU] (discussing the risks that money market funds pose to the 
financial system and the need to reform them). 
 33.  Smallberg, supra note 31, at 3; Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Statement on Money Market Fund Reform (August 22, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171484078 
[https://perma.cc/AGC4-AUZJ].  
 34.  Smallberg, supra note 31, at 4. 
 35.  Id.; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Regarding 
Money Market Funds (August 23, 2012) https://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/ 
PublicStmt/1365171491044 [https://perma.cc/L5HA-VS94]. 
 36.  Laura Marcinek & Tom Keene, Levitt Says SEC Money-Fund Punt a ‘National 
Disgrace’, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2012, 1:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
08-23/levitt-says-sec-inaction-on-funds-national-disgrace-tom-keene.html/ 
[https://perma.cc/JPM9-7TQC]. 
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Thus, where money funds are concerned, it appears that the SEC had 
been captured at the commissioner level.  However, the money fund 
situation is fraught with financial complexities and ambiguities.  
Reasonable people can disagree about proposed solutions.  Commissioner 
Aguilar vigorously defended his position.  When asked if his former 
position in the industry made him more sympathetic to the industry point of 
view, his answer was no.  “‘It gives me a level of knowledge,’ he 
explained. ‘I think my background gives me the ability to understand and 
put into context both the . . . pros and cons of their arguments.’”37
The SEC Division of Investment Management has responsibility for 
the mutual fund industry.  The revolving door at the Division of Investment 
Management is also well documented.  In 2003, Professor John Freeman 
made a Freedom of Information Act request for the names of former senior 
Division of Investment Management employees.  He found that 80% of 
non-deceased senior employees who had left the SEC were “were either 
employed in-house by investment companies or advisers, the ICI, law 
firms, or accounting firms that provided services to mutual funds and fund 
sponsors.”38
Moreover, two recent Directors of the Division of Investment 
Management actually came from the investment management industry.  
Eileen Rominger, who served as Director of the SEC Division of 
Investment Management from February 2011 to June 2012, had been 
previously Chief Investment Officer of the portfolio management business 
in Goldman Sachs Asset Management.39  Norman Champ, Director from 
July, 2012 to January, 2015 was former Executive Vice President and 
General Counsel of Chilton Investment Company, an investment adviser to 
hedge funds and managed accounts.40  The fact that a regulator has 
connections to the investment management industry is not necessarily 
disqualifying.  Indeed, in some cases it may be a necessity to understand 
the issues, however, it will always be potentially dangerous.  As noted in 
the POGO study: 
The close linkage between the regulators and the regulated can 
influence the culture, the values, and the mindset of the agency—
not to mention its regulatory and enforcement policies—both 
 37.  Smallberg, supra note 31, at 5. 
 38.  John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 J. CORP. L. 739, 
743 (2007). 
 39.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Eileen Rominger as 
Director of Division of Investment Management (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2011/2011-14.htm [https://perma.cc/HYT7-UPTC].   
 40.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investment Management Director 
Norm Champ to Leave SEC (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
11.html [https://perma.cc/BNN4-VTEQ]. 
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from the bottom up and from the top down. To be sure, many 
employees may be immune to its influence and may explicitly 
reject it. But when so much of a regulatory agency’s world view 
can be shaped by the industry it oversees, consciously or 
otherwise, the public has reason to be concerned.41
The concern is justified.  There is every reason to believe that industry 
interests are shown great deference in the SEC’s Division of Investment 
Management.  It will be demonstrated next that the typical mutual fund 
investor is very much in need of protection.  Subsequent sections will show 
that the public trust placed in the SEC to protect mutual fund investor 
interests has been systematically violated. 
III. FINANCIAL LITERACY
Research on the financial literacy of the general population presents a 
bleak picture.  In Annamaria Lusardi’s exemplary review, she defines 
financial literacy as “the ability to process economic information and make 
informed decisions about financial planning, wealth accumulation, debt and 
pensions.”42  She finds that “most individuals in the United States . . . 
cannot perform simple calculations and do not understand basic financial 
concepts such as interest compounding, the difference between nominal 
and real values and risk diversification.”43
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress instructed the SEC to conduct a 
study of investor financial literacy.44  The study was conducted in two 
parts.  The SEC contracted with the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress45 to conduct a review of the quantitative studies on the 
financial literacy of retail investors in the United States.46  The SEC also 
conducted extensive survey research of a large sample of investors.47
The SEC Study found results similar to those of Lusardi: 
 41.  Smallberg, supra note 31, at 7. 
 42.  Annamaria Lusardi, Financial literacy: Do People Know the ABCs of Finance?, 24 
PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF SCI. 260 (2015). 
 43.  Id. at 261. 
 44.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 917, 124 Stat. 1376, 1836 (2010). 
 45.  OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY
REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 14 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YAG-W66M] 
[hereinafter SEC Study].
 46.  FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG.,
FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG RETAIL INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PL42-7PFN].
 47.  SEC Study, supra note 46. 
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U.S. retail investors lack basic financial literacy.  The studies 
demonstrate that investors have a weak grasp of elementary 
financial concepts. . . . Surveys also demonstrate that certain 
subgroups, including women, African-Americans, Hispanics, the 
oldest segment of the elderly population, and those who are 
poorly educated, have an even greater lack of investment 
knowledge than the average general population.48
The lack of financial literacy translates into well-documented, sub-
optimal investment behavior.  The evidence is that investors in general 
make predictable mistakes: “They save too little, they trade too frequently, 
they buy high and sell low, they invest in fad instruments they do not 
understand, and they pay excessive fees.”49
Of special interest is the finding that investors pay excessive fees.  
Studies strongly suggest that, of the information available to retail 
investors, mutual fund expenses are the best predictor of future returns.50  It 
has been shown that individual investors often buy funds with high fees51
and that substantial amounts have gone into index funds charging high fees 
(over 2% per year) for passive holdings of broad indexes, such as the 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500.52  Thus, evidence pertaining to investor 
awareness of fees is especially important and within the purview of SEC 
regulation. 
Empirical evidence supports the idea that fund investors are unaware 
of fees charged on funds.  An SEC survey found that only 19% of investors 
could give an estimate of expenses for their largest mutual fund.53  A 
minority of respondents (43%) claimed to have known of the expenses of 
their largest funds at purchase and only 16% of survey respondents 
believed that higher expenses led to lower than average returns.54  Another 
study found that 84% of investors believe higher operating expenses mean 
better performance.55  Similarly, Wallison and Litan surveyed mutual fund 
 48.  Id. at iii. 
 49.  Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly 
Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 606 (2014). 
 50.  See, e.g., Russell Kinnel, Predictive Power of Fees: Why Mutual Fund Fees Are So 
Important, MORNINGSTAR (May 4, 2016), http://corporate1.morningstar.com/ 
ResearchArticle.aspx?documentId=752589 [https://perma.cc/R288-DJ7N]. 
 51.  Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds,
51 J. FIN. 783, 784 (1996). 
 52.  Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Jeffrey A. Busse, Are Investors Rational? 
Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261 (2004).
 53.  Gordon J. Alexander, Jonathan D. Jones & Peter J. Nigro, Mutual Fund 
Shareholders: Characteristics, Investor Knowledge, and Sources of Information, 7 FIN.
SERVS. REV. 301, 309 (1998).
 54.  Id.
 55.  Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The 
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investors and asked them to rate (on a scale of one to ten) how informed 
they were about their own mutual fund investments.56  Only 21% of those 
investors rated their knowledge high (eight or above).57  Fewer than 10% of 
even that self-described knowledgeable subgroup “knew even 
approximately what they were paying as an advisory fee.”58
It is well known that compounded over time, even small percentage 
cost differences can result in dramatic differences in investment outcomes.  
Given the complexity of the investment world and documented lack of 
sophistication of most investors, it is important that the SEC foster simple, 
clear, and explicit cost disclosure.  Unfortunately, as the examples in the 
following sections show, the SEC’s efforts in this regard appear less than 
exemplary. 
IV. BROAD REGULATORY CAPTURE - ADVISORY FEES,
DISTRIBUTION FEES, AND SOFT DOLLARS
The examples of broad capture documented here—advisory fees, 
distribution fees, and soft dollars—occurred between 1970 and 1980.  The 
mutual fund investment management industry was able to preempt the 
SEC’s initiative on advisory fees59 by influencing Congress in the 1970 
Amendment60 to the 1940 Investment Company Act.61  Congress carved out 
an exemption for soft dollar commissions in 197562 and the SEC allowed 
mutual funds to use assets to pay for distribution (marketing) in 1980.63
Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2099 (2005). 
 56.  PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY TO 
ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 73 (2007). 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Id.
 59.  For more discussion on this, see WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF 
MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274 (1962) [hereinafter Wharton Report]; U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R.
REP. NO. 89-2337 (1966) [hereinafter PPI Study].
 60.  Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b (2006)). 
 61.  Investment Company and Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“ICA”), Pub. L. No. 
76-678, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (2012)). 
 62.  Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 21, 89 Stat. 97, 160-61 
(1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2012)). 
 63.  Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898, 73,898 
(Nov. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270.12b-1). 
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A. Advisory Fees 
Mutual funds are unique.  Unlike normal corporations, mutual funds 
do not have employees or physical assets.  Effectively, the corporation or 
trust is a collection of contracts with certain service providers.  First among 
the service providers is the manager of the fund’s portfolio, an investment 
management firm.  The investment management firm also creates the 
mutual fund and the fund is inextricably tied to it.  Investment managers 
who create and manage mutual funds are often referred to as fund sponsors.  
Fund sponsors appoint the fund’s trustees, and officers of the fund sponsor 
typically serve as board members.64
The fund sponsor is paid for the portfolio management services it 
provides.  The portfolio management or advisory fee is a percentage rate 
charged annually against fund assets.65  For instance, if a fund has $1 
billion in assets and the advisory or management fee is fifty basis points 
(0.5%), then the fund sponsor will receive annual revenues of $1 billion 
times 0.005 or $5 million.  That amount, $5 million, reduces the value of 
the fund-to-fund investors by $5 million per year, thereby lowering the rate 
of return to fund investors.  Thus, there is a fundamental conflict of interest 
between the fund sponsor and investors in the mutual fund.  The fund is 
operated by the sponsor and is a captive entity – the mutual fund boards of 
directors or trustees essentially face a monopoly seller of advisory services.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “the forces of arm’s-length 
bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as 
they do in other sectors of the American economy.”66
Because of this monopoly positioning, there is potential for a sponsor 
to overcharge the mutual fund for services provided.  For example, the SEC 
commissioned a study by the Wharton School in 1962; it found substantial 
overcharging in the industry as a whole when mutual fund advisory fees 
were compared to advisory fees determined by competitive forces.67  In a 
follow-up study in 1966, the SEC itself documented similar results.68
 64.  See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1961, 1967-68 (2010) (covering how mutual funds are formed and operated); John 
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure 
and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (discussing the organization of mutual 
funds).
 65.  Fisch, supra note 64, at 1971-72. 
 66.  Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010), quoting S. Rep. No. 91-
184, at 5 (1969). 
 67.  Wharton Report, supra note 59, at 29 (“Advisory fee rates charged mutual funds 
tended to be substantially higher than those charged by the same advisers to the aggregate of 
their clients other than investment companies, for comparable asset levels.”). 
 68.  PPI Study, supra note 59, at 73. 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 102 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 102 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
5_BROWN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:35 PM
714 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
The SEC recommended that Congress impose a reasonableness 
standard enforceable in court.69  This recommendation was consistent with 
the observation that fund sponsors are in a monopoly position vis-a-vis the 
funds they manage and that competitive forces fail to operate on mutual 
fund fees.70
The Wharton and SEC reports presented Congress with a visible 
public problem that forced it to address the issue of fund fees. After several 
years of wrangling, Congress passed the 1970 amendment to the 1940 
Investment Company Act.71  Rather than imposing a reasonableness 
standard, the amendment made fund sponsors fiduciaries with respect to 
fees received from funds and created a private cause of action on advisory 
fees.72  On the surface, this represented a reasonable compromise.  
However, the language in the Senate Report made its true position clear: 
In reporting this bill, your committee recognizes the importance 
of permitting adequate compensation and incentives so that men 
of ability and integrity will continue to be attracted to the mutual 
fund industry. . . . [Y]our committee has decided that there is an 
adequate basis to delete the express statutory requirement of 
“reasonableness,” and to substitute a different method of testing 
management compensation. This bill states that the mutual fund 
investment advisor has a specific “fiduciary duty” in respect to 
management fee compensation. . . . This provision does not 
represent a finding by the committee as to the level of fees in the 
industry. Your committee does not believe itself qualified to 
make such judgments. Nor it is contemplated that the 
Commission will seek a general reduction of fees on an 
industrywide basis.73
The Senate wanted to facilitate the “adequate compensation and 
incentives so that men of ability and integrity will continue to be attracted 
to the mutual fund industry.”74  The SEC was clearly attempting to act in 
the public interest and conducted extensive research to support its position, 
yet the Senate basically ignored the findings of the Wharton School and its 
own securities regulator.  Congress essentially told the SEC “hands off,” 
neutering the SEC with respect to advisory fees going forward; for nearly 
fifty years, the SEC has indeed kept its hands off and the overcharging of 
 69.  Id. at 143-47. 
 70.  Wharton Report, supra note 59, at 30. 
 71.  Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b (2006)). 
 72.  15 U.S.C. §80a-35(b) (2012). 
 73.  Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 91-184, at 4-7 (1969) 
(emphasis added). 
 74.  Id. at 4. 
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mutual fund investors continues to this day.75  The 1970 amendments to the 
ICA represented a capitulation of the U.S. Congress to the investment 
management industry and forced surrender of the SEC on advisory fees.  
Special interest influences and the capture of the SEC are blatantly and 
explicitly on exhibit in a prime example of broad regulatory capture.76
B. Distribution Fees 
If a manufacturer wants to sell more products, it will spend money on 
marketing.  An informed judgment will be made that the short-term 
 75.  Although the Senate imposed a fiduciary duty on fund sponsors with respect to 
fees, it handed the judicial system the problem of establishing a fiduciary standard to gauge 
fee excessiveness.  The tone and language of the report leave no doubt as to which side of 
the argument the Senate favored – that of men of “ability and integrity” rather than the 
financial experts at Wharton and the SEC, thus endorsing the status quo.  The courts also 
faced the problem that the Wharton- and SEC-documented inflated advisory fees did not 
disappear.  Monopoly pricing power of fund sponsors and overcharging of advisory fees 
persists, as observed by Freeman and Brown in their updating of the Wharton and PPI 
studies.  John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of 
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 672 (2001).  The industry was able to maintain fee 
levels with the aid of a brilliant legal strategy, which involved bringing to trial funds with 
anomalous expense categories that enabled the industry to fog up fee comparisons with fees 
actually determined at arm’s length. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 
923 (2d Cir. 1982), recently reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010), which established an especially onerous fiduciary 
standard: “To be guilty of a violation . . . , therefore, the adviser-manager must charge a fee 
that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services 
rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg, 694 
F.2d at 928 (emphasis added).  The standard is so onerous that no plaintiff has ever received 
an award under §36B of the ICA.  See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1109 (6th ed. 2009) (“Subsequent litigation in excessive fee cases 
has resulted almost uniformly in judgments for the defendants”).  The 1970 Act limited 
damages in fee cases to a one-year look-back period and, as a result, incentives in fee cases 
favor settlement.  See John C. Coates IV, The Downside of Judicial Restraint: The (Non-) 
Effect of Jones v. Harris, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 58, 59-60 (2010) (suggesting 
that shareholders do recover through settlements although their lawyers are the primary 
beneficiaries).  A typical settlement in a fee case would involve a slight reduction in fees for 
a limited time period, a procedure known as “prospective relief.”  Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
receive a percentage of the total fee savings and respondents avoid an unfavorable fee 
precedent.  I estimate that on an annual basis investment management firms overcharge 
mutual fund customers by about $35 billion per year.  Brown, supra note 15, at 400.  Thus, 
the neutering of the SEC with respect to advisory fees has had serious monetary 
consequences for the investing public.  
 76.  Dozens of law review articles published on the 1970 Amendment to ICA 
universally fail to mention what is plainly obvious in the Senate Report: the Amendment 
was biased in favor of the investment management industry and politics played a major part 
in the legislation.  It seems as though there is a major blind spot in the legal literature when 
it comes to the role of politics and influence in the legislative process.
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increase in costs and concomitant decrease in profits will yield increased 
sales and profits in the future. 
The mutual fund industry is different.  In what might be the all-time 
regulatory coup, the industry induced regulators to approve a fee on 
existing shareholders in order to pay marketing costs to attract new 
shareholders.  A decent analogy would be banking regulators allowing 
banks to impose a fee increase on the balances of checking account 
customers to attract new customers with the promise of reduced fees in the 
future.  Of course, the lower fees never materialize. 
In the normal course of business, if a fund sponsor wants to increase 
revenues from advising a mutual fund, it will expend money on marketing 
to increase the fund’s asset base.  Fund marketing costs are often called 
distribution costs.  Increased fund assets will increase sponsor revenues 
because advisory fee revenue is a (typically) fixed percentage of assets.  
However, if the fund sponsor industry has influence with regulators, it 
could persuade them to permit the imposition of a fee on existing 
customers to achieve an increase in assets.  That is exactly what happened 
in 1980 when the SEC passed Rule 12b-1, which permitted fund sponsors 
to tap fund assets to pay for distribution costs.77  Existing customers 
received no material benefit from the fees, but fund sponsors profited 
handsomely.  The SEC faced two choices: it could allow the industry to 
fund distribution costs out of profits, or it could impose an asset-based fee 
on fund investors.  The industry favored the latter approach and that is what 
the SEC chose to do.  Although the SEC’s reasoning is murky, common 
sense and financial analysis recommend the former.  The alternatives may 
be clarified with a simple, if somewhat stylized, example. 
Assume that there is a money market mutual fund with current assets 
of $2 billion and an annual advisory fee of fifty basis points (0.5%).  
Assume that the economy is in a period of high interest rates, not unlike 
that of the 1970’s and that the fund has a gross yield (prior to fees) of 10%.  
Also assume that the fund sponsor realizes a 70% profit margin ((Revenues 
– Costs)/Revenues)78 on the fees received for managing the fund.  Finally, 
 77.  Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, 45 Fed. Reg. 73,898, 73,898 
(Nov. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270.12b-1). 
 78.  Margins at that level are typical of money market funds then and now.  The money 
fund in Gartenberg, the seminal advisory fee case, has a gross profit margin of 96%.  
Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930-31.  In Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. 
Supp. 962, 989 n.77 (S.D.N.Y 1987), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York established the fiduciary standard maximum operating profit margin for fee cases 
at around 77%, stating the following: 
The Court wishes to make clear that it is not holding that a profit margin of up 
to 77.3% can never be excessive. In fact, under other circumstances, such a 
profit margin could very well be excessive. For example, if advisory services 
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assume that an individual investor in the fund currently has an account with 
$100,000 invested in the fund. 
Table 1 highlights the financial differences between two alternatives: 
paying marketing and distribution costs out of fund sponsor profits or 
paying them with a levy on fund assets.  Period 1 (Column A) is the base 
case and shows the fund sponsor with profits of $7 million, which 
represents a profit margin of 70% on revenues of $10 million (half a 
percent of $2 billion).  Period 2 (Columns B and C) shows the results under 
each alternative.  It is assumed that marketing costs of $5 million79 are 
expended in Period 2 and that this results in a doubling of fund assets to $4 
billion.  The Top Panel shows results for the fund sponsor and the bottom 
panel for the individual investor. 
The principal insight from this analysis is that if the sponsor pays for 
marketing costs out of advisory revenues, its profits will suffer in the short 
run but will benefit in the future from the increased asset base.  The 
investor is no better or worse off under this scenario.  If marketing costs are 
charged to fund assets, the sponsor is unequivocally better off because he 
or she sustains profit margins on a much higher asset base.  The investor is 
unequivocally worse off because he or she suffers from a decrease in 
returns with no benefits.  Finally, it is useful to note that under Scenario B, 
the accounting is appropriate; the sponsor bears the costs and also reaps the 
benefits of the expenditures for marketing.  Fund Investors are held 
harmless. 
being challenged were not of the highest quality and if the directors were not so 
obviously qualified, fully informed, and conscientious, a similar fee structure 
could violate section 36(b). This Court is simply holding that on the facts 
presented here, the fee schedules at issue represent charges within the range of 
what would have been negotiated at arms-length in the light of all of the 
surrounding circumstances. 
The consulting firm, Mutual Fund Governance Consulting, publishes summary profit 
margin numbers.  In 2008, operating margins on money funds averaged about 70%.  C. 
Meyrick Payne & Sara Yerkey, Profitability Benchmarks in Contract Renewal – April 2008,
MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE CONSULTING (Jan. 19, 2017, 2:30 PM), 
http://production.mfgovern.com/content/view/71/91 [https://perma.cc/3TSQ-XZBR].
 79.  Five million dollars is the equivalent of a twenty-five basis points fee against initial 
fund assets, the typical distribution fee imposed.  This is for illustration purposes only.  An 
actual fund sponsor would make a business judgment and gauge the trade-off between the 
initial hit on short-term profits and the probable long-term gain from an increased asset 
base.
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TABLE 1
Column  A B C 
Period  1 2 2 
Initial Position Sponsor Pays 
Distribution Costs 
Investor Pays 
Distribution 
Costs 
Results for Fund 
Sponsor 
   
Assets  2,000,000,000  4,000,000,000  4,000,000,000  
Revenues 10,000,000 20,000,000  20,000,000 
Costs     
Operating
Costs
3,000,000 6,000,000  6,000,000 
Distribution
Costs
 5,000,000  
Total
Costs 
3,000,000 11,000,000  6,000,000 
Operating Profits 7,000,000 9,000,000 14,000,000 
Operating Profit 
Margin 
70% 45% 70% 
Results for Fund 
Investor
   
Funds Invested 100,000 100,000 100,000
Gross Earnings @ 
10% 
 10,000 10,000
Less
Fees
    
Advisory
Fee
 500 500
Distribution
Fee
 0 250
Total Fees   500 750 
Net Earnings After 
Fees
 9,500 9,250 
Net Return After Fees  9.5% 9.25% 
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It is useful to examine the genesis of Rule 12b-1.80
In the 1970’s, the mutual fund industry was experiencing net 
redemptions and asked the SEC for help.  At that time, front load fees were 
the primary method of marketing mutual funds.  Here are the recollections 
of Alan Mostoff, director of the Division of Investment Management at the 
time: 
And then I remember the distribution hearings that concluded in 
the middle ’70s, participating in a meeting with the former 
chairman of the SEC, Hamer Budge, who was at the time the 
chairman of the IDS Mutual Funds where he was seeking 
compassion from the Commission because the funds were in net 
redemption and he argued that something needed to be done to 
help funds with distribution. I remember after the Commission 
meeting speaking with Irving Pollack, who was then a 
Commissioner. He said, “You know, we’ve got to do something 
here.” And I said, “You’re right.” And we started on the path that 
ultimately led to the adoption of Rule 12(b)-1 in 1981.81
The revolving door at the highest levels is on full display; the IDS 
Chairman and former SEC Commissioner was not arguing for help for 
individual investors.  The industry was asking the regulators for help for 
the industry.  With Rule 12b-1, the SEC helped the industry to the clear 
detriment of individual investors.82
The SEC commissioned a study83 that eventually led to the imposition 
of marketing (distribution) fees on fund assets.  For reasons that are not 
 80.  See, e.g., John P. Freeman, The Use of Mutual Fund Assets to Pay Marketing 
Costs, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 533, 543-48 (1978) (describing both sides of the debate between 
the SEC and the fund industry concerning whether mutual fund assets could be used as a 
source of payment for marketing costs); The Roundtable on Investment Company 
Regulation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Dec. 4, 2002), 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/programs/INV1204Transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VTY6-ZPKX] [hereinafter Roundtable].
 81.  Interview by Richard Rowe with Allan Mostoff, Gen. Counsel, Dechert LLP, in 
D.C. (Oct. 30, 2002), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45. 
r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-histories/mostoff100202Transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L6DR-XHFG]. 
 82.  Where distribution fees are concerned, the distinction between broad and narrow 
capture is blurred.  SEC Commissioners are political appointees and subject to political 
pressures.  SEC staff responded to pressure from above with no obvious venal motivation on 
their part.  So, the Commission was apparently captured, but staff integrity was not 
compromised.  Industry influence was clearly at work, but was it broad or narrow capture?  
 83.  See DIV. OF INV. MGMT. REG., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MUTUAL FUND
DISTRIBUTION AND SECTION 22(D) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 19, 20 (1974) 
(noting that “net redemption status has lately replaced the sales records the industry earlier 
enjoyed” and how fund distribution “seems to have become even less profitable . . .”). 
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entirely clear, during the rulemaking process, the SEC conflated “advisor 
profits” and “fund assets.” Freeman tells us that: 
Drawing on written submissions and testimony from industry 
participants, the SEC staff reached various conclusions. Those 
findings are worth noting because they affirm the SEC staff’s 
understanding that the sales push was linked to compensation and 
its appreciation that fund assets (under the euphemism of 
“advisory profits”) were already being used to pay for 
distribution in the fund industry.84
 84.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 753.  Note how “advisor profits” are viewed by the SEC 
staff as a “euphemism” for fund assets.  This is inaccurate because, consistent with the 
implications of Table 1, if marketing costs come directly from fund assets, they do not 
reduce advisor profits.  The genesis of the confusion appears to be the uncritical acceptance 
(intentional or otherwise) of somewhat ambiguous (intentional or otherwise) statements by 
John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group of mutual funds, a no-load complex:  
[W]e want to reemphasize that in the conventional mutual fund complex today, 
the aggregate management or advisory fees generated by the funds as a group 
provide substantially all of the resources expended for the distribution of each 
fund in the group. In the case of no-load funds, all of the resources allocated to 
distribution are provided by these fees, since no other revenues are generated. In 
the case of funds with sales commissions, most of the distribution costs are 
financed by such management fees, since the sales concession revenues retained 
by the adviser are almost always wholly inadequate to cover these costs. 
Therefore, the proposed Vanguard arrangements for the joint sharing of 
distribution costs do not depart from present industry practice. They merely 
make explicit (with the commensurate benefits of full disclosure) what is 
already implicit in the financing of mutual fund distribution on an industry-wide 
basis.
The simple fact of the matter is that mutual fund shareholders are the sole 
source of financing all mutual fund activities— whether administration, 
advisory, or distribution.  
Freeman, supra note 80, at 536-37 n.18 (quoting John C. Bogle, Proposed Statement on the 
Vanguard Distribution Application at the Securities and Exchange Commission Hearing 32 
(Jan. 5, 1978)) (last emphasis added).  Freeman then adds: “The Proposed Vanguard 
Statement indicates that assets of the Vanguard complex of funds have been used, and are 
being used, to pay marketing costs of over $1 million annually.”  Id.  This appears to be an 
inaccurate statement because paying for distribution costs out of advisory fees is not 
equivalent to paying them directly out of assets.  There are three things to note about 
Bogle’s statement: 1) Prior to 12b-1, all distribution costs were paid out of aggregate 
advisory fees.  This is consistent with the implications of Table 1; 2) Bogle never explicitly 
stated that fund assets were used directly for distribution; 3) It is a true statement that 
ultimately “shareholders are the sole source of financing all mutual fund activities.”  
However, it is true only insofar as shareholders pay for distribution costs indirectly by 
paying for advisory services and fund sponsors (appropriately) use advisory revenues to pay 
for marketing.  Sponsor profits are therefore reduced by such expenditures.  It appears as 
though Bogle’s statements contain a studied ambiguity designed to allow the SEC to 
rationalize paying for distribution costs out of fund assets, the ultimate aim of the industry. 
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Prior to 1980 and the passage of Rule 12b-1 the use of advisor profits 
was the only means available for no-load funds to market their funds.  
Thus, there was implied if not explicit regulatory approval for the 
procedure.  However, it is clear from Table 1 above that paying for 
distribution costs from fund sponsor profits is very different from paying 
them directly from fund assets.  Problems arose when the possibility of 
explicitly paying for distribution from fund profits occurred.  Freeman 
reveals how the SEC granted a no-action letter to Mutual Liquid Assets, 
which wanted to explicitly 
“reallocate” one-half of the advisory fee (.25 percent) to dealers 
selling the fund. . . . In essence, the Mutual Liquid Assets no-
action request presented an opportunity to move the practice of 
using fund assets for marketing costs out of the closet. The staff’s 
response indicated that if the management of Mutual Liquid 
Assets had nerve enough to fully and fairly disclose what they 
planned to do with fund shareholders’ money, then the Division 
of Investment Management had nerve enough to let them.85
Note again the conflation of advisory fees with fund “shareholder’s 
money” (assets).  If the SEC confused fund assets with advisor profits, the 
industry and the ICI did not.  In response to the Mutual Liquid Assets no-
action letter: 
In a letter on a “matter of extreme urgency” that was hand-carried 
to the SEC, the Investment Company Institute’s senior vice 
president and general counsel complained that the staff had made 
“apparent changes in the ground rules” dealing with payment for 
fund marketing costs in the absence of a public expression by the 
Commission through promulgation of a rule or a release.86
Later, the SEC instructed staff to withdraw the Mutual Liquid Assets 
no-action letter.87  In 1978, the SEC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking regarding the conditions under which it might permit funds to 
use assets to finance distribution expenses.88  The SEC received more than 
fifty comments on this proposal and thirty of the comments, including 
twenty from individual investors, opposed the proposal.89  Thus, the SEC 
imposed Rule 12b-1 over the united disapproval of the individual investors 
 85.  Freeman, supra note 80, at 541. 
 86.  Id. at 541-42. 
 87.  Id. at 542. 
 88.  Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Bearing of Distribution Expenses 
by Mutual Funds, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,589 (May 23, 1978).
 89.  Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,014, 54,015 
(proposed Sept. 17, 1979). 
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who weighed in on the issue.  Essentially, the SEC capitulated to the fund 
industry.
It is useful to note that prior to the imposition of Rule 12b-1, under 
Section 12(b) of the ICA, investment managers were forbidden to utilize 
fund assets for distribution purposes.90  The reason for the prohibition was 
the concern that if “a fund grows in size only by heightened marketing or 
other distribution efforts, and the fund itself pays for such efforts, the 
adviser stands to reap greater compensation for reasons divorced from the 
fund’s investment performance.”91  Consistent with this concern, the SEC 
initially proposed that fund advisers, rather than continuing to be paid 
management fees based on the size of their funds, might be required to 
agree to a fixed dollar payment.92  The SEC also proposed protecting 
existing shareholders who had already absorbed the distribution expenses 
attendant to their purchases: 
Accordingly, the SEC proposed that these shareholders be 
“grandfathered,” protected against indirectly bearing, in any part, 
payments out of fund assets to sell new shares to investors[.] . . . 
However, these two conditions – flat management fees for 
advisers and grandfathering of existing shareholders – were 
dropped in the face of fund industry opposition.93
The industry argued that there would be prospective benefits to 
investors because as asset levels increased in the future, economies of scale 
would allow for a decrease in fees.94  This assertion was apparently met 
with some skepticism from the SEC.  Rule 12b-1 as implemented required 
fund directors to annually review the plan and “conclude, in the exercise of 
reasonable business judgment and in light of their fiduciary duties under 
state law and section 36 of the Act, that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the [12b-1] plan will benefit the fund and its shareholders.”95
Of course, the prospective financial benefits to investors never 
materialized.  An SEC staff study in 2000 found “that, everything else 
equal, funds with 12b-1 fees had total expenses that were higher than those 
of other funds, but by an amount that was slightly less than the maximum 
12b-I fee.”96  Essentially, what this says is that expense ratios rose by an 
 90.  Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate 
Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 35 (2016). 
 91.  Id.
 92.  Id. at 38. 
 93.  Id. at 39. 
 94.  Freeman, supra note 80, at 543-55. 
 95.  Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management 
Investment Companies, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,258, 23,275 (June 21, 1988) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, and 274).
 96.  DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES
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amount approximately equal to distribution fees.  Similarly, SEC-employed 
economist Dr. Lori Walsh carefully examined the evidence on distribution 
fees and found: 
[W]hile funds with 12b-1 plans do, in fact, grow faster than funds 
without them, shareholders are not obtaining benefits in the form 
of lower average expenses or lower flow volatility. Fund 
shareholders are paying the costs to grow the fund, while the 
fund adviser is the primary beneficiary of the fund’s growth.97
Thus, available evidence confirms the essential insights from Table 1.  
Fund sponsors profit handsomely from offloading distribution costs on the 
public and the public receives little or no financial benefit. 
The industry was able to outmaneuver the SEC once distribution fees 
were allowed.  The small, twenty-five basis point fee envisioned by the 
SEC in 1980 soon morphed into the hundred basis point fees typical 
today.98  The incremental seventy-five basis points support Contingent 
Deferred Sales Charges (CDSCs).99  CDSCs are a form of sales 
commission where the commission is paid over time by an incremental 
12b-1 fee added to the expense ratio.100  Research indicates that investors 
are less aware of and sensitive to fees buried in an expense ratio than they 
are to explicit sales loads.101
There has been extensive abuse of CDSCs especially as it relates to B 
Share or back load funds.  A broker who recommends and sells B Shares 
realizes an immediate commission in the neighborhood of 5%.  However, 
the fund purchaser pays for the commission or load over time in the form 
of a seventy-five basis point per year increased distribution fee.  As long as 
the fund is held for a specified period, typically seven or eight years, the 
investors will pay no additional fees.  If sold prior to the specified period 
the investor will pay a fee, which is the difference between the amount paid 
via distribution fees and the actual commission paid to the selling broker.  
Hence the term “back-end load” fund.102
AND EXPENSES § III(D)(i) (2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm
[https://perma.cc/G4DH-WE65] [hereinafter SEC Staff Study].
 97.  Lori Walsh, The Costs and Benefits to Fund Shareholders of 12B-1 Plans: An 
Examination of Fund Flows, Expenses and Returns, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 2 (Apr. 30, 
2004), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4GG-K252] [hereinafter Walsh Report].
 98.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 777. 
 99.  Contingent Deferred Sales Charges (CDSCs) are also referred to as Contingent 
Deferred Sales Loads (CDSLs). 
 100.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 761-62. 
 101.  Barber et al., supra note 55, at 2118. 
 102.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 762-67. 
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The SEC never envisioned the imposition of CDSCs when it imposed 
Rule 12b-1 in 1980.  The tone of discussion of 12b-1 fees at the meeting of 
the SEC Historical Society in 2002 is revealing.  One comment by Kathryn 
McGrath,103 Director of the SEC Division of Investment Management from 
1983 to 1990, is especially illuminating: “My biggest failure, I think, was 
trying to tackle and clean up Rule 12b-1 . . . . There was too much money 
flowing through 12(b)-1 fees to make it touchable.”104  It is telling that the 
failure to clean up 12b-1 fees had nothing to do with public policy or 
investor protection and everything to do with political clout.  As Freeman 
has said, “The money flowing to Wall Street through 12b-1 in the 1980s is 
a pittance compared to the nearly $12 billion generated annually by the rule 
today.  If 12b-1 was ‘untouchable’ in the 1980s, one cannot be optimistic 
about reform today.”105
Given the evidence that there has been no discernable diminution of 
overall fees resulting from Rule 12b-1, it is of interest to note the abject 
failure of mutual fund trustees and board members as it relates to 
distribution fees.  Approximately 60% of all mutual funds impose 
distribution fees and in the more than thirty-five years since 1980 every 
mutual fund board has annually certified that: “in the exercise of reasonable 
business judgment and in light of their fiduciary duties under state law and 
under sections 36(a) and (b) . . . of the Act,…there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the plan will benefit the company and its shareholders.”106
Given the research evidence cited above, it is clear that the whole annual 
exercise is a charade and that boards and trustees are captives of fund 
sponsors.  Mutual fund investors have been systematically fleeced for 
thirty-five years. 
Rule 12b-1 is still in effect today and makes less sense now than it did 
in 1980.  Freeman, one of the original architects of distribution fees, 
characterizes the current distribution system as a “mess.”107  He has written: 
“When Rule 12b-1’s supposed plusses are scrutinized closely, it becomes 
evident that the money management industry has outwitted and 
outmaneuvered the federal agency that supposedly regulates it, to 
investors’ detriment.”108
The passage of Rule 12b-1 is another clear example of broad 
regulatory capture of the SEC.  The rule was instituted to help the 
 103.  Biography of Kathryn Bradley McGrath, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/rule12b-1/bio/kbmcgrath.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNN8-
C2RB]. 
 104.  Roundtable, supra note 80, at 108. 
 105.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 788. 
 106.  17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2016). 
 107.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 788. 
 108.  Id. at 809. 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 108 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 108 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
5_BROWN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:35 PM
2017]MUTUAL FUNDS AND THE REGULATORY CAPTURE OF THE SEC 725 
investment management industry and, in retrospect, was contrary to the 
public interest.  Apparently, SEC staff believed that allowing the industry 
to tap into fund assets was no different than allowing fund sponsors to use 
profits to fund distribution.  The belief that fund assets and sponsor profits 
are equivalent was voiced by SEC alumni at the meeting of the SEC 
Historical Society in 2002.109  That belief apparently exists today. 
In the matter of CDSCs, the industry was able to outmaneuver the 
SEC and the extra fees became “untouchable.”110  SEC staff was naïve but 
probably not venal.  It does not appear as though the SEC staff was “for 
sale.”  This example of broad regulatory capture of the SEC has resulted in 
billions of dollars per year of inappropriate fees charged against fund 
assets.111
C. Soft Dollars 
The term “soft dollars” seems to carry a rather benign connotation.  
The reality could not be more different.  David Swensen, Chief Investment 
Officer of Yale University, characterizes soft dollars as “the slimy 
underbelly of the investment world, [that] deserve a harsher name that 
reflects the odious nature of the kickbacks they describe.”112
In effect, soft dollars are like distribution fees: they involve 
investment managers spending shareholders’ money on items such as 
research or other services113 that would normally reduce their profits.114
Soft dollars reduce shareholder returns and, unlike distribution fees, which 
are at least explicitly disclosed, they are totally opaque to shareholders. 
 109.  Roundtable, supra note 80, at 94-95. 
 110.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 788. 
 111.  At the end of 2007, the year that Freeman published his article and prior to the 
2008 market meltdown, open-end fund assets exclusive of money funds totaled about $8.5 
trillion.  Distribution fees totaled about $13.5 billion with approximately 60% supporting 
shareholder services and 40% supporting CDSCs.  Since 2007, the dollar level of advisory 
fees has been essentially flat in spite of a new doubling of mutual fund assets.  This is the 
result of a dramatic increase of assets invested passively as well as some investors avoiding 
funds with distribution fees.  This information has been compiled from MORNINGSTAR
DIRECT, http://www.morningstar.com/company/direct [https://perma.cc/88TP-MLEX].   
 112.  DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO 
PERSONAL INVESTMENT 205 (2005).
 113.  THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, SOFT DOLLARS AND OTHER TRADING
ACTIVITIES § 1:1 (2016). 
 114.  Many fund sponsors disclose dollar commission costs in the annual Statement of 
Additional Information, a report few shareholders are even aware of.  Soft dollar amounts 
are never reported.  Funds do report trading activity in the abstract when they disclose 
turnover ratios.
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Most mutual funds are actively managed which means that they 
frequently buy and sell securities in an attempt to outperform benchmark 
portfolios.  When securities are traded, a commission must be paid to the 
brokerage firm that executes the trade.  Commission costs are added to the 
costs of security purchases and deducted from the proceeds of sales.  Thus, 
commissions are a drag on shareholder returns.  Commission costs are 
invisible because they are never explicitly disclosed in prospectuses or 
shareholder reports. 
Commission costs on institutional sized trades are typically about a 
penny a share.  When soft dollars are involved, commission costs are 
typically about five cents per share.115  The extra four cents per share may 
seem small, but it costs investors hundreds of millions of dollars per year in 
extra costs for which they receive no benefit.  Investment management 
firms receive benefits in the form of “research” from brokerage firms.116
Research costs are a normal cost for investment management firms, and 
thus, soft dollars, like distribution fees, are a method investment managers 
use to get shareholders to pay some of their costs and thus subsidize their 
(fund sponsor) profits.117
Soft dollar arrangements, an artifact of the 1975 deregulation of 
brokerage commissions, are currently legal.  Before May 1, 1975, the New 
York Stock Exchange fixed commission rates.118  Because brokerage firms 
were unable to compete on price (commission rates), they attracted 
institutional trades by bundling research reports and advice with brokerage 
services.119  Thus, institutional consumers of brokerage services were 
paying excessive commissions but the excesses were (supposedly) offset by 
the value of the research they received from the brokerage firms. 
The SEC-mandated negotiated commission rates in 1975 would have 
broken the relationship between commissions and bundled research.120
 115.  Michael A. Goldstein et al., Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading 
Patterns, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 5175, 5180 (2009). 
 116.  Fisch, supra note 64, at 2000. 
 117.  See OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS,
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND MUTUAL FUNDS (Sept. 22, 1998), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm [https://perma.cc/NN8Z-Q9FA] (finding 
management firms also use funds in soft dollar arrangements for non-research items such as 
telephone bills, legal expenses, and administrative purpose, among other things). 
 118.  See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 662 (1975) (discussing how the 
practice of fixed commission rates led to, as of May 1, 1975, the elimination of fixed rates). 
 119.  D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and Economics, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1556 (2009). 
 120.  See Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No. 
11,203, 6 SEC Docket 147 (Jan. 23, 1975) (discussing how Rule 19b-3 prohibits any 
exchange from requiring its members to charge fixed commission rates after a certain date 
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However, the brokerage and money management industries convinced the 
U.S. Congress to intervene.  Congress carved out a safe harbor exemption 
by enacting Section 28(e)121 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Under 
the exemption, brokerage firms could legally charge above-market 
commission rates by bundling “research” with commissions.122  It bears 
repeating that research costs are actually an expense of the money manager 
and should be charged against its profits.  By charging above-market 
commission rates, fund shareholders effectively subsidize advisor profits. 
The soft dollar carve-out did not occur in a vacuum.  It occurred 
because brokerage and money management special interests were able to 
persuade Congress to help them at the expense of the investing public, a 
clear manifestation of broad regulatory capture.  Absent the carve-out for 
soft dollars, the SEC would not have allowed fund companies to pay 
excessive commissions at the expense of fund investors. 
Initially, the SEC interpreted the soft dollar carve-out narrowly.  They 
ruled that the safe harbor does not apply to research products that are 
“readily and customarily available . . . to the general public on a 
commercial basis.”123  This narrow interpretation was consistent with the 
SEC’s protection of investors within the confines of the loophole that 
Congress created.  Eventually, as an apparent result of narrow capture, the 
SEC loosened this strict interpretation of what constituted research.  This 
process will be examined in the next section. 
V. NARROW REGULATORY CAPTURE – FEE DISCLOSURE,
DISTRIBUTION FEES, SOFT DOLLAR COMMISSIONS, AND 
TRADING COSTS.
The SEC bills itself as the investors’ advocate.124  The evidence 
suggests otherwise.  The SEC Division of Investment Management has 
been at best passive in the face of industry misinformation and at worst 
complicit with the mutual fund industry in blocking needed reforms. 
The effective narrow capture of the SEC is largely a recent occurrence 
that has arisen in the context of increased pressure from the U.S. Congress 
and other sources to act contrary to industry interests and in the public 
or authorize members to “arrange for the charging of fixed rates of commission”).
 121.  Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 21, 89 Stat. 97, 161 
(1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78bb (2012)). 
 122.  Id.
 123.  Fiduciary Money Managers: Use of Commission Payments by Fiduciaries, 
Exchange Act Release No. 12,251, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,678, 13,679 (Mar. 31, 1976). 
 124.  Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Council 
of Institutional Investors (Apr. 6, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/ 
spch040609mls.htm [https://perma.cc/5ZRM-WJ9W]. 
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interest.  The genesis of the reform pressures was the mutual fund scandals 
that came to light in 2003. 
Unfortunately, the benign involvement of the U.S. Congress was 
unsuccessful because of industry intervention and the industry remains 
essentially unreformed. 
In October 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer criticized 
the SEC for not detecting mutual fund industry wrongdoing.  “‘This has 
been an outrageous betrayal of the public trust by that agency,’ he said in 
an interview. ‘The regulators who were supposed to have been watching 
this industry were asleep at the switch. And I’m going to pull that 
switch.’”125  The wrongdoings that Mr. Spitzer identified focused on the 
practices of late trading and market timing, although he was also concerned 
about corporate governance of mutual funds and the overcharging of 
mutual fund customers relative to institutional clients. 
The essence of wrongdoing in the late trading and market timing 
schemes is that investment managers assisted large investors like hedge 
funds in skimming gains that belong to long-term customers, typically 
small investors.  Late trading enables some customers to trade mutual funds 
at Net Assets Value (NAV) prices after the 4 PM deadline for order 
entry.126  If significant news hits after 4 PM and a hedge fund can trade at 4 
PM prices, the hedge fund has effectively arbitraged the mutual fund.  The 
improper short term trading dilutes long-term investor gains.  It has been 
estimated that late trading in international funds cost long term 
shareholders an annual average of 3.8 basis points.127  The corresponding 
cost for domestic equity funds was 0.9 basis points from 1998 to 2003.128  It 
was estimated that the cost to long-term mutual fund investors was in the 
neighborhood of $400 million per year.129
Market timing is similar in result although more complicated in 
explanation.  It involves arbitrage of mutual fund NAV’s using stale prices, 
typically for funds that own foreign securities.  International stocks trade in 
different time zones.  Some of these stocks may not have traded for as 
 125.  Tom Lauricella et al., Mutual Funds Face Overhaul As Spitzer and SEC Fight for 
Turf, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2003, at A1.
 126.  Id. See also Fast Answers: Late Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/latetrading.htm [https://perma.cc/LJB4-BX3A] (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2017) (defining “Late Trading” as “the practice of placing orders to buy or redeem 
mutual fund shares after the time as of which a mutual fund has calculated its net asset value 
(NAV), usually as of the close of trading at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time, but receiving the price 
based on the prior NAV already determined as of that day.”). 
 127.  Eric Zitzewitz, How Widespread Was Late Trading in Mutual Funds?, AM. ECON.
REV. 284, 284 (2006).
 128.  Id.
 129.  Id.
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much as fifteen hours ahead of the 4 PM valuation points in the U.S.  If 
U.S. or other markets have risen since the closing of the foreign market, it 
is a safe bet that the foreign market will move in the same direction when it 
opens again.  It has been estimated that trading in stale prices permited 
arbitrageurs to earn excess returns between 35% and 70% per year trading 
in international funds. The costs of market timing to mutual fund 
shareholders approximated $5 billion per year.130
It turns out that the SEC was not totally asleep at the switch where 
market timing was concerned.  In April 2001, the SEC sent a letter to the 
ICI advising mutual funds that when significant events occur a fund must 
value the portfolio pursuant to a “fair value pricing methodology.”131  The 
procedure would have effectively eliminated stale price arbitrage but was 
essentially ignored by the industry.  Columbia Law Professor John C. 
Coffee, Jr. had some interesting and nuanced insights into this clear 
example of regulatory capture: 
[T]he ICI mounted a political campaign and issued an elaborate 
white paper in 2002, defending the right of a fund in good faith to 
rely on the closing market price in the foreign market and 
resisting any obligation to predict future value. Joining the fray 
on the side of their clients, the committee on mutual fund law of 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which is 
prominent in the securities law field, warned the SEC’s staff that 
it had no “basis to contest the good faith of directors in making 
fair value determinations.” Members of Congress also wrote 
critical letters to the SEC. . . . In consequence, the SEC staff in 
late 2001 appears to have backed away from its earlier insistence 
on fair valuing, not abandoning its policy on a formal level but 
lowering the profile of its position and ceasing to interpret it in 
ways that constrained fund managers. . . . Deep down, what is at 
work here is less a formal policy of accommodation than the 
habitual response of overworked bureaucrats operating in an 
esoteric and insular field of law that the public does not 
understand and that is dominated by a powerful lobby playing the 
role of the 600-pound gorilla. Add to this mix a rapidly revolving 
door between the SEC and private legal practice, and SEC 
staffers tend to learn that, unless an issue has become high 
profile, it is best not to rock the boat. Efforts to expand the law 
only gain a staffer the reputation of a troublesome dissident and 
 130.  Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual 
Funds, 19 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 245, 246 (2003). 
 131.  Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. & Chief Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Div. Inv. Mgmt., to Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. (Apr. 30, 2001), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/tyle043001.htm [https://perma.cc/6NXP-
5QLR].
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interfere with his ability to return to private practice with an 
enhanced resume.132
Once Mr. Spitzer publicly revealed the industry’s wrongdoing, the 
SEC quickly responded to the late trading and market timing loopholes.133
The U.S. Congress, now alerted to problems in the mutual fund industry far 
beyond the narrow confines of late trading and market timing, proposed 
legislation that would, among other things, eliminate distribution fees and 
soft dollars and significantly enhance disclosure of advisory and trading 
costs.134  This presented the SEC with a very visible and needed blueprint 
of reform in the industry.  As the next section demonstrates, the SEC was 
able to mitigate or avoid imposing new and necessary regulation of the 
industry and the industry was able to largely blunt the proposed legislation.  
In short, the industry was able to maintain the status quo because it had 
successfully captured the SEC. 
A. Fee Disclosure – Undisclosed Dollar Expenses 
The primary means by which the SEC fulfills its mission to protect 
investors and assure they are well-served is through requiring the full 
disclosure of relevant information.  The issue of appropriate disclosure as it 
relates to mutual funds is especially important given the large and 
increasing numbers of inexperienced investors who are forced to make 
important decisions about mutual funds in retirement accounts.  A previous 
section documented the academic evidence that most mutual fund investors 
are naïve or lack fundamental knowledge of the financial environment or 
both.135  This view is supported by former SEC Commissioner Arthur 
Levitt, who wrote subsequent to his tenure at the SEC: 
I think fund companies believe that the underinformed investor is 
a more profitable investor. Barry Barbash, who as head of the 
SEC’s Division of Investment Management oversaw the mutual 
fund industry, told me in 1993 that he had no idea how much 
investors really understood about mutual funds. So we hired a 
polling firm to find out. After several surveys and even a few 
 132.  John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where was the SEC when the Mutual 
Fund Scandal Happened?, LEGAL AFFAIRS 48-49 (Mar.-Apr. 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review_coffee_marapr04.msp 
[https://perma.cc/K78B-AXTC]. 
 133.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Takes Steps to Address Late 
Trading, Market Timing and Related Abuses, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
168.htm [https://perma.cc/WB2Z-ADW2]. 
 134.  Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong. §§ 310-317 (2004). 
 135.  See Lusardi, supra note 42, at 261 (demonstrating the poor results from a study 
based on survey questions formulated to measure a general understanding of finance).
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focus groups—efforts the Investment Company Institute, the 
industry’s trade group, derided as pseudo-scientific—we realized 
that most investors were even more befuddled than we had 
imagined.136
Chairman Levitt is not alone in his post-retirement view that the 
industry seeks to keep mutual fund investors “underinformed.”  Other 
authors have also charged the SEC with being overly solicitous of industry 
views and ignoring the academic research on mutual fund literacy of 
investors:
By advancing the notion of a functioning, investor-driven market, 
the ICI discourages intrusive regulation of the industry.  The ICI 
has masterfully played the role of supporting disclosure-
simplification reforms in the name of investor empowerment, 
while resisting providing clear, comparative information 
regarding fund costs on the grounds that investors can glean such 
information on their own. 
The SEC has undertaken only marginal reforms, primarily 
focused on streamlined disclosure and formulaic warnings.  
Relying significantly on the industry for information about 
investor needs, the SEC has largely accepted the story of a well-
functioning market.  While the SEC’s reforms play around the 
edges of addressing investors’ inability to fend for themselves, 
the agency seems in denial about the extent of this problem.  The 
SEC’s almost complete disregard of academic studies of fund 
investor behavior ensures that investors’ limitations will continue 
to be greatly underestimated, and that any further reforms will 
miss their mark.137
Dollar mutual fund fees are essentially invisible.  Fees are 
automatically deducted from a fund’s assets.  Investors never see an 
invoice and never have to write a check.  Moreover, investors never know 
what actual dollar expenses are being subtracted from their investment 
balances.138  Yet fees can have a dramatic impact on fund returns when 
compounded over time.  The disclosure of annual dollar expenses on an 
investor’s mutual fund or brokerage statement would be an unequivocal 
 136.  ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE
AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN DO TO FIGHT BACK 43 (2002). 
 137.  Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles,
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934, 1018-19 (2008). 
 138.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-00-126, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL
DISCLOSURE COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION 7 (2000), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156959.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HSP-NPQ9] (showing that 
investors do not see specific “in dollar amounts” that were deducted from their funds on 
account statements). 
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plus for investors.  There is no plausible reason that investors should not 
know exactly and explicitly what expenses they are paying. 
In 2001, the U.S. General Accounting Office, in conjunction with a 
study of mutual funds, recommended that “the Chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) require that the quarterly account 
statements that mutual fund investors receive include information on the 
specific dollar amount of each investors’ share of the operating expenses 
that were deducted from the value of the shares they own.”139  The Mutual 
Fund Reform Act of 2004140 also recommended that the SEC require that 
fund managers display dollar expenses on quarterly account statements. 
The industry pushed back against these recommendations.  The ICI 
commissioned a survey of the mutual fund industry.141  The main argument 
against the proposal was the incremental costs involved, which were found 
to be in the neighborhood of $65 million annually after an initial one-time 
cost of about $200 million.  The ICI argued that these costs were a 
prohibitive burden on an industry with annual revenues above $100 billion 
and where profit margins in the range of 50% to 60% are the norm.142  The 
$65 million of annual costs represents about 0.065 of 1% of annual industry 
revenues and a small fraction of the approximately $12 billion of annual 
distribution fees paid by investors. 
The SEC chose not to follow the recommendations of the GAO or the 
Mutual Fund Reform Act, opting instead for a procedure that would require 
the investor to calculate an estimate of his annual dollar costs.143
We acknowledge that individualized expense disclosure in 
quarterly account statements would have the benefit of providing 
cost disclosure tailored to each investor. Our approach, however, 
effectively permits an investor to estimate this personalized 
information readily (by dividing the investor’s account value by 
$1,000 and multiplying the result by the cost shown for a $1,000 
investment). . . . One commenter estimated, based on a survey of 
various industry participants conducted in 2000, that the 
aggregate costs to survey respondents associated with calculating 
and disclosing individualized fund expenses would be $200.4 
 139.  Id. at 1. 
 140.  Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong. § 210 (2004).  After 
extensive hearings and testimony, S. 2059 died in the Senate Banking Committee.  See infra
note 212 and accompanying text (describing the details surrounding the death of the bill). 
 141.  ICI Survey on GAO Report on Mutual Fund Fees, INV. CO. INST., (Jan. 31, 2001), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/03_sec_shreport_appa.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8HP-Z9Z9]. 
 142.  Id. at 2. 
 143.  Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, Exchange Act 
Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Release No. 26372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244, 
11,247 (Mar. 9, 2004). 
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million in initial implementation costs and $65 million in annual, 
ongoing costs (footnote omitted). By contrast, we estimate that 
the costs for standardized cost disclosure in shareholder reports, 
including printing and mailing costs, and the costs of preparing 
the new disclosure, would total approximately $16 million 
annually.144
The SEC rationale is highly disingenuous.  The most important impact 
of the disclosure of actual fees would be to increase investor awareness, 
which the SEC approach fails to do.  Moreover, given the documented lack 
of financial literacy of the investing public, it is highly doubtful how 
“readily” the typical individual investor could estimate this personalized 
information.  However, the procedure is clearly inferior to a personalized 
disclosure.  The decision was ostensibly made on the basis of incremental 
costs to the industry and not the interest of investors.  Costs aside, the 
industry avoided having to explicitly reveal dollar costs to investors 
because they were able to persuade the SEC to support their position.  As 
Arthur Levitt has said, “[t]o the industry, one of the greatest design features 
of funds is the way they artfully camouflage fees as a percentage of 
assets.”145
B. Distribution Fees 
Rule 12b-1 was adopted by the SEC in 1980 and was problematic 
from the start.  The cost savings promised by the industry never 
materialized and the fees morphed into uses not contemplated by the SEC 
when the rule was promulgated.  The use of 12b-1 fees to support CDSCs 
enabled (and still enables) the industry to effectively camouflage sales 
commissions by burying them in the expense ratio, where the use of the 
funds is disguised. 
The SEC has faced increasing pressure to reform on eliminate 12b-1 
fees.  The evidence that distribution fees are essentially deadweight costs 
exposed by the SEC146 and Walsh studies147 highlighted problems with the 
program.  Then, after extensive hearings, the Mutual Fund Reform Act 
(MFRA) of 2004148 recommended the elimination of distribution fees.  The 
testimony of the bill’s primary architect, Senator Peter Fitzgerald, is 
insightful and instructive: 
 144.  Id.
 145.  LEVITT, supra note 136, at 47. 
 146.  SEC Staff Study, supra note 96. 
 147.  See Walsh Report, supra note 97 (showing the intended benefit of distribution fees 
does not actually exist). 
 148.  Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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F ree market principles would typically discipline excessive 
distribution costs as a direct bite out of profits — but fund 
advisers are (1) collecting their substantial fees as a percentage of 
fund assets; and (b) financing the sustained swelling of those 
very same assets with investors’ money. Put another way, the 
King compels the cook to buy the food that fattens the King. 
Does the King worry about his food budget? Unlikely. MFRA 
rearranges this incentive structure — without dictating any 
specific diet. Fund advisers will now bear distribution expenses 
— and if, as appears virtually self-evident, some of these 
expenses are excessive, we can be certain that fund advisers, 
spending their own money, will discover the cost discipline that 
has been elusive to date. 
Only Congress can rationalize the fund distribution system 
that its own Act of 64 years ago created — and that the SEC 
complicated with its well-intended but injuriously-perpetuated 
Rule 12b-1.149
The encyclopedic article on distribution fees by Professor John 
Freeman examined the issues in great detail.150  A principal problem with 
distribution fees revolves around “Spread Loads” or “Contingent Deferred 
Sales Charges” (CDSCs).  A threshold issue is the problematic use of the 
term “contingent” in describing the fees in “B” shares or back load share 
classes.  In fact, there is nothing contingent about the fee.151  The broker is 
paid the sales fee immediately and the (typically) seventy-five basis point 
12b-1 fee is used to amortize a loan that funds the payment.152  The only 
contingency is that if the fund is sold prior to the total amortization of the 
loan, the investor must then pay the balance of the loan.  This procedure 
gives rise to several problems, first among which is the potential deception 
involved with the use of the term “contingent.”  A selling broker may 
truthfully say to the customer that “if you buy “B” shares and you do not 
sell for a certain period you will pay no sales load.”  This is a truthful but 
deceptive and incomplete statement because although there is technically 
no front-end sales load, there is a commission and the customer pays for it.  
Problems arise when uninformed investors are tricked into believing that 
they are getting something for nothing, i.e., buying a fund without a sales 
commission as long as they hold it for a specified period.  The broker gets 
 149.  Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald, Statement on S. 2059, the Mutual Fund Reform Act of 
2004, at 6 (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/a553f774-
92aa-40b2-9ef9-7969cb3b5c3d/33A699FF535D59925B69836A6E068FD0.fitzgerald.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/BAQ4-EPHJ] [hereinafter Fitzgerald Statement].  
 150.  Freeman, supra note 38. 
 151.  Id. at 763. 
 152.  Id. at 765. 
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the commission, and the customer pays it over time in the form of 
distribution fees.  Don Phillips, Morningstar’s Managing Director, has 
commented: 
What I think is right with the negative opinion about 12b-1 fees 
is this hugely complicated selection process of a mutual fund. 
And it allowed the fund industry to create or to carry out 
something that frankly was unfair.  The notion that “B” shares 
were no-load funds.  I’ve talked to thousands of investors literally 
who came to me and said, “I bought a no-load fund.”  And then 
you ask them what they bought, and they bought the “B” shares 
of a load fund organization. They thought they were getting 
something for free.153
Former SEC Chairman Levitt had some words of wisdom for 
investors in his book, written after his tenure at the SEC: 
Naturally, investors don’t like it when funds skim 5 percent of 
their savings right off the top.  So fund companies have figured 
out ways to hide some of the load by assessing annual fees that 
you pay as a percent of your assets in the fund.  This is called a 
“distribution” fee, or a 12b-1 fee, after the Investment Company 
Act rule that governs such fees. . . . You should avoid owning 
shares in a fund that charges these fees . . . 154
There are other problems with CDSCs.  One is that the loans 
supporting the upfront payment of sales commissions span multiple years 
yet fund boards and trustees must certify yearly that the program benefits 
the fund and its investors.  A board could hardly de-certify a program and 
cause a default on the loans being supported by the CDSCs. 
Freeman documents other abuses associated with CDSCs.  One is that 
the investors are sometimes not offered the best deal where loads are 
concerned.  Most front load funds have breakpoints in their fees schedules 
where the percentage commission is reduced as the amount of money 
invested increases.  Typically, “B” shares or back load fund classes do not 
have such breakpoints.  It is not unknown for brokers to sell B shares in 
amounts that come close to, but do not exceed, the breakpoints on front 
load funds.  The reduction in commission resulting from a few more dollars 
in a load fund is thus avoided, and the broker earns a higher percentage 
commission.155
 153.  Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund Summit Transcript, 73 MISS. L.J. 1153, 1187 
(2004) (remarks of Don Phillips, Managing Director of Morningstar, Inc.) (giving a panelist 
answer to a question at Mutual Fund Summit). 
 154.  LEVITT, supra note 136, at 47-48. 
 155.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 763. 
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Freeman also documents how some funds continue to charge 12b-1 
fees on back load funds even though the loan supporting the original 
commission has been discharged.156  Moreover, some funds continue to 
charge 12b-1 shareholder service fees even though the fund is closed to 
new investors.  It is difficult to see how current shareholders should be 
charged an ongoing fee to attract new investors when the fund is closed to 
new investors.157
The twenty-five basis point shareholder service fee is also being used 
for purposes not envisioned when the original rule was put in place.  It has 
become common for the fee to be used to pay for inclusion of the fund(s) in 
online Mutual Fund Supermarkets.  Fund sponsors derive the benefits of 
increased assets on funds sold through supermarkets and fund sponsors 
should bear the costs.158
Finally, it is useful to consider: what is a “distribution fee?”  The very 
name of the charge is ambiguous and lacks descriptive clarity.  A more 
descriptive label would have been “marketing fee,” and it is curious that the 
SEC disguised the fee from the beginning. 
In 2010, the SEC published a proposed new rule for mutual fund 
distribution fees, apparently in response to the ongoing criticism of 12b-1 
fees.  In the proposed new rule, the SEC took the step of re-naming the fee, 
now to be called the 12b-2 fee.  Aside from mostly cosmetic changes, the 
new rule leaves 12b-1 essentially unchanged.159  Moreover, the few 
changes that could have an impact have yet to be implemented because, for 
unknown reasons, the proposed new rule is in limbo. 
Before proposing the new rule, the SEC solicited the views of investor 
advocates, fund industry representatives, independent directors, and 
representatives from broker dealers and other intermediaries.  A roundtable 
discussion was held on June 19, 2007.160  The new rule was heavily 
influenced by the results of that discussion. 
 156.  Id. at 806. 
 157.  Id. at 781-82. 
 158.  HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN CYBERSPACE § 9.02 (2015). 
 159.  Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,064, 47,074 
(proposed Aug. 4, 2010). See Jack W. Murphy et al., SEC Proposes Changes to Structure 
for Mutual Fund Distribution Fees, DECHERT ONPOINT (Aug. 5, 2010), 
https://www.dechert.com/SEC_Proposes_Changes_to_Structure_for_Mutual_Fund_Distribu
tion_Fees_08-05-2010/ [https://perma.cc/2VSU-4L8T] (discussing the proposed rules). 
 160.  See Commission Roundtable on Rule 12b-1, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jun. 19, 
2007), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/rule12b-1.htm [https://perma.cc/UJ98-DCVK] 
(providing links to various materials relating to the rule 12b–1 Roundtable); see also 2007
Commission Roundtable Unofficial Transcript, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jun. 19, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2007/12b1transcript-061907.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9GE-MMAM] (providing an unofficial transcript of the Jun. 19, 2007 
commission roundtable) [hereinafter Commission Roundtable Transcript].
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A central theme of the roundtable and the proposed rule is the role of 
12b-1 fees as they support CDSCs.  The ICI or industry position was that 
CDSCs are a convenient way for investors to decide how they want to 
compensate investment professionals to aid them in their mutual fund 
choices.  According to the industry, informed investors can either pay a 
front load or choose to spread the cost over time by paying increased 
distribution fees.161  There are problems with the industry position.  An 
investor sophisticated enough to actually balance the trade-off between 
front load and back or level load funds is smart enough to know that paying 
loads of any sort is inferior to no load alternatives.  In essence, if investors 
need brokers to recommend funds, they are probably not sophisticated 
enough to make an informed choice about sales charges. 
Some roundtable participants questioned whether investors are aware 
of and make informed choices about the services they pay for through 12b-
1 fees, “which many panelists agreed lacks the prominence of a front-end 
load.”162  Industry representatives asserted that many investors prefer to pay 
sales charges over time rather than up front.163  Some roundtable 
participants called for outright abolition of CDSCs.164  In the discussion the 
SEC acknowledged some of the problems of 12b-1 fees: “Moreover, the 
rule has confounded many investors who remain unsure what a ‘12b-1 fee’ 
is, how it impacts their account, and whether they should be willing to 
invest in a fund that imposes such a fee.”165
Given that the SEC itself found that many investors are confused 
about 12b-1 fees and some investors are duped into purchasing funds with 
CDSCs, it would seem that a regulator focused on protecting investors 
would abolish CDSCs.  In a clear win for the industry, the SEC decided 
otherwise: 
We do not believe that it would benefit fund investors to return to 
the era in which they paid a substantial front-end sales load and 
did not have access to various alternative forms of distribution 
payment arrangements.  Denying investors the ability to select 
alternative distribution methods or to pay for distribution services 
over time is not the goal of this rulemaking.166
 161.  Commission Roundtable Transcript, supra note 160, at 88. 
 162.  Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 47,072. 
 163.  Id.
 164.  Id. at 47,073. 
 165.  Id. at 47,075. 
 166.  Id. at 47,074. 
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This pathetic rationale for not addressing CDSCs is in substance a 
capitulation to the fund industry and exemplifies the industry’s capture of 
the SEC.167
The proposed new rule jettisoned the need for special board findings, 
a written 12b-1 plan and an annual renewal of the plan, thus eliminating the 
charade necessitated by annual certification by the board that the plan 
benefited both the fund and shareholders. 
One provision could have a salutary effect.  The annual twenty-five 
basis points shareholder service fee is now to be explicitly labeled the 
“marketing and service fee.”168  In addition, the fees supporting CDSCs are 
now to be explicitly listed as the “ongoing sales charge.”169  This would be 
a step in making clear and transparent the true nature of distribution fees.  
Unfortunately, six years have passed since the SEC “proposed” new rules 
and the changes have yet to be implemented. 
The failure to eliminate or significantly reform the distribution fee 
mess is clear evidence of regulatory capture of the SEC.  As Freeman so 
aptly opined: “A simple, naïve concept has evolved into something 
seriously flawed, if not grotesque.”170
C. Soft Dollars Commissions 
In 1986, the SEC loosened its interpretation of Section 28e to permit a 
wider range of permissible uses of soft dollars, including “mixed-use” 
products and services that covered both research and administrative costs 
(e.g., computer hardware, communications equipment, and publications).171
Investment management firms were thus able to avoid significant  
administrative costs and further enhance profitability at the expense of fund 
shareholders.172
In a 1998 Inspection Report, the SEC found that “a significant number 
of broker-dealers (35%) and advisers (28%) provided and received non-
 167.  Note the use of the term “substantial” when associated with front load funds with 
the implication that CDSCs are not substantially equivalent or larger.  Over time, there are 
no substantive differences in sales loads paid between front load and spread load fund 
classes.  Thus, it is false and disingenuous in the extreme to characterize front loads as 
“substantial” because it implies that spread loads are lower and insubstantial.  This is a 
subtle but telling indication of the Commission voicing industry talking points and 
absorbing the industry world view.   
 168.  Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 47,074. 
 169.  Id.
 170.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 804. 
 171.  Securities; Brokerage and Research Services, Exchange Act Release No. 23,170, 
51 Fed. Reg. 16,004 (Apr. 23, 1986). 
 172.  See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and 
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006). 
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research products and services in soft dollar arrangements.”173  Instead of 
taking steps to reduce abuses the report concluded that the SEC “should 
reiterate and provide additional guidance,” “consider adopting 
recordkeeping requirements,” “require more meaningful disclosure,” and 
“encourage firms to adopt internal controls.”174  David Swensen is not 
impressed: “Instead of protecting investor interests, the SEC defended Wall 
Street’s gravy train.”175
In 2001, the SEC issued a release176 that extended the safe harbor 
beyond commissions associated with agency trades to include fees paid on 
riskless principal transactions and that benefitted brokers and fund sponsors 
at the further expense of fund shareholders. 
The net effect of the loosening of standards was that fund managers 
were able to further enhance profits because they could lay off even more 
expenses on fund shareholders.  As Marianne Jennings has put it: 
 The assumption on the benefits arguments was that the dollars 
above normal commissions were indeed providing return for the 
clients because of their use for insight and research.  The problem 
was, well, that it all depended on the meaning of the term 
“research.”  Further exploration of the pass-along arrangements 
and the steep commissions revealed that research provided to the 
money managers from the broker/dealers included 
• Computers (can’t use Excel spreadsheets without a 
computer) 
• Trips and conferences (in theory to sit and learn about the 
research but which, in practice, involved posh resorts and 
much golfing) 
• Tickets to sporting events (what better forum for learning 
the latest in market trends?) 
• Gifts, gifts, gifts 
• Sometimes gifts in the form of cash 
In short, the soft dollars allowed a great deal of “stuff” to flow to 
money managers from firms that had an interest in more and 
more trades executed at the direction of more and more money 
managers who were drawn to the broker/dealer firms not by their 
 173.  OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMISSION, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS,
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND MUTUAL FUNDS 3 (1998), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/softdolr.htm [https://perma.cc/MHK8-SG7V]. 
 174.   Id. at 2. 
 175.  SWENSEN, supra note 112, at 292. 
 176.  Commission Guidance on the Scope of Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act, 
Exchange Act Release No. 45,194 (Dec. 27, 2001), 67 Fed. Reg. 6 (Jan. 2, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-45194.htm [https://perma.cc/9XQW-H9U9]. 
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crackerjack research but rather by their ability to come up with 
the most “research,” or perhaps the most creative and rewarding 
ways of conveying “research.” 
. . . . 
Management of conflicts of interest is not difficult because there 
are only two solutions: Don’t do it, or disclose it.177
In the early 2000s, pressure built to either eliminate soft dollars or 
disclose them fully.  The 2003 GAO study178 recommended disclosure, as 
did the CFA Institute.179
In the wake of the late trading market timing scandals of 2003, the 
U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill with overwhelming bi-partisan 
support that would, among other things, have eliminated soft dollars.180
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs held 
extensive hearings on mutual fund reform.181  The Committee heard from 
many witnesses, including Benn Steil, a senior fellow at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, who testified that the soft dollar loophole “has given rise 
to a vast industry-wide kickback scheme through which fund managers use 
institutional brokers to transfer fundholder assets to themselves in a manner 
totally invisible to the fundholders.”182  The House bill and a similar Senate 
bill failed in the Senate Banking Committee, as discussed in Part V and VI. 
In 2004, a NASD (now FINRA) Task Force, whose members included 
substantial industry representation, issued a report on soft dollars 
recommending that the SEC retain the soft dollar exemption but require 
significant disclosure of soft dollar arrangements to funds boards and 
shareholders.183
 177.  Marianne M. Jennings, Come See the Harder Side of Soft Dollars, 11 CORP. FIN.
REV. 44, 45-46 (2007).  However, note how Ms. Jennings’s insights are cogent but 
incomplete. There is a common misconception that the problem with soft dollars is that they 
are used to pay for non-research activities as if research is somehow appropriate.  Since 
research is properly an expense of the fund manager, paying above-market rates on 
commissions bundled with research benefits the advisor at the expense of investors.  
 178.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-763, MUTUAL FUNDS: GREATER
TRANSPARENCY NEEDED IN DISCLOSURES TO INVESTORS 56-57 (2003), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/238496.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHQ8-BWMZ]. 
 179.  Soft-Dollar Standards: Guidance for Ethical Practices Involving Client Brokerage,
CFA INST. 7-9 (Nov. 2011), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2004.n1.4005 
[https://perma.cc/JT89-KVWH].  
 180.  Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003, H.R. 2420, 108th Cong. 
(2003).
 181.  Review of Current Investigations and Regulatory Actions Regarding the Mutual 
Fund Industry: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
 182.  Id. at 787 (statement of Benn Steil, Ph.D., André Meyer Senior Fellow in 
International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations).
 183.  Report of the Mutual Fund Task Force: Soft Dollars and Portfolio Transaction 
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In a move to preempt full disclosure of soft dollars, the ICI urged the 
SEC to issue new interpretive guidance and rules for soft dollars payments 
and the safe harbor: 
The ICI believes that the SEC should issue a new interpretive 
release that, for purposes of Section 28(e), excludes from the 
definition of “brokerage and research services” the following: (1) 
computer hardware and software, and other electronic 
communications facilities, used in connection with trading or 
investment decision-making; (2) publications, including books, 
periodicals, newspapers and electronic publications, that are 
available to the general public; and (3) third-party research 
services . . . .184
In 2006, the SEC issued new interpretative guidance for soft dollars 
that significantly tightened the rules for allowable soft dollar expenses.185
The rules largely followed ICI recommendations but did not require 
enhanced disclosure of soft dollar commissions.186  The ICI’s gambit was 
thus successful.187
There followed a rather curious incident.  Christopher Cox, Chairman 
of the SEC and former congressman, made efforts to ban the use of soft 
dollars.  In a move that made it clear that he spoke as an individual and not 
as Chairman of the SEC, Cox sent a letter to Senate Banking Committee 
Costs, NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS (NASD) 5 (2004), http://www.finra.org/ 
sites/default/files/Industry/p012356.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVW2-WTJG].  
 184.  Letter from Matthew P. Fink, President, Inv. Co. Inst., to William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Request for Rulemaking Concerning Soft Dollars 
and Directed Brokerage (Dec. 16. 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-492.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VJ9D-88MG]. 
 185.  Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 
28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54,165 (July 18, 
2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978 (July 24, 2006). See SEC Releases New Interpretive Guidance 
on Soft Dollar Arrangements, DECHERT ONPOINT (Aug. 2006), https://www.dechert.com/ 
files/Publication/bc1b1796-285c-4fd6-93fd-2d089e30e09e/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/2e4311fb-8238-4f41-91fa-2d9de9287df8/FS_Update11_8-06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GWY-NNTV] (explaining the guidance and providing context). 
 186.  Id.
 187.  The industry has incentives to keep soft dollar commissions opaque.  See Roger 
Edelen, Richard Evans & Gregory Kadlec, Shedding Light on “Invisible” Costs: Trading 
Costs and Mutual Fund Performance, 69 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33 (2013) (explaining that 
investment funds benefit from less soft dollar disclosure).  For example, Edelen finds that 
soft dollars for research are more negatively related to fund performance than expensed 
research for similar services).  For each ten basis point increase in the cost of bundled soft 
dollar commissions, fund performance declines by a statistically significant twenty-one 
basis points.  Moreover, mutual fund investors respond differently to soft dollar 
commissions than to expensed research payments. Expensed research is transparent and has 
a negative impact on inflows from investors.  In contrast, soft dollar commissions are 
opaque and have a positive impact on investor inflows.  
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Chairman Christopher Dodd, and House Financial Services Committee 
Chairman Barney Frank, in which he suggested that a “legislative fix” 
might be warranted with regards to the soft dollar issue.188  Cox elaborated 
his views in a speech in New York, as reported by Reuters: 
Soft-dollar deals — where money managers pay inflated 
commissions to get favors such as free stock research from 
brokerages — need tighter regulation, the top U.S. market 
regulator said on Thursday. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman 
Christopher Cox vowed to push Congress to reform or even 
repeal laws that allow soft-dollar transactions, which some critics 
say present conflicts of interest and cheat investors. 
“Soft dollar needs to see the light of day,” Cox said in a 
speech to the National Italian American Foundation. 
“This witch’s brew of hidden fees, conflicts of interest and 
complexity of application is at odds with the investor’s best 
interest.”189
Mr. Cox’s candor and clarity were commendable but ultimately failed 
as Congress did not act on his proposal.  The unusual incident speaks to a 
split within the SEC.  Mr. Cox clearly did not have the votes to, at a 
minimum, force additional disclosure of soft dollars.  Given the pressure to 
reform or eliminate soft dollars from the GAO, CFA Institute, Congress, 
and the NASD Task Force, the Commission chose to stand pat and tinker 
around the edges of allowable soft dollar expense categories in yet another 
example of narrow regulatory capture. 
Soft dollars continue to be legal. This clear conflict of interest on the 
part of the fund sponsors costs fund shareholders hundreds of millions of 
dollars each year. 
D. Disclosure of Trading Costs 
In addition to percentage annual expenses disclosed in the Expense 
Ratio, there are other very substantial expenses that are undisclosed.  When 
a mutual fund trades securities, trading costs (the sum of brokerage 
commissions, bid-ask spreads, and the market impact of trades) are added 
to the cost of purchases or deducted from the proceeds of sales.  These 
costs are material but are not included in expense ratios. 
 188.  Judith Burns, Cox Vows to Penetrate Soft-Dollar “Fog”; SEC Chairman Urges 
Congress to Eliminate Fee-Research Bundling, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2007, at C15. 
 189.  Joseph Giannone, SEC Head Urges Crackdown on “Soft Dollar” Deals, REUTERS
BUS. NEWS (May 31, 2007, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/businesspro-sec-
softdollars-dc-idUSN3122527720070531 [https://perma.cc/VXT7-TSF9]. 
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Over the period 1996 to 2009, the average management fees (a subset 
of the total expense ratio) paid by U.S. equity mutual funds were 0.73% of 
TNA (Total Net Assets), while the average brokerage commissions were 
0.33% of TNA.190  These results are similar to findings by Livingston and 
O’Neal.191
Brokerage commissions understate actual trading costs because they 
ignore bid-ask spreads and the impact of trades on the price of the security.  
Because mutual funds trade in large blocks, the market impact costs are 
substantial.  Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec found average expense ratios of 
1.14% and trading costs of 1.44%, which generate a total drag on returns of 
about 2.6%.192  The findings from Edelen et al. are startling: mutual fund 
trading costs are higher on average than expense ratios but are 
undisclosed.193
The SEC is well aware of these costs.  In the wake of the mutual fund 
scandals in the early 2000s, both the House and Senate held extensive 
hearings and produced legislation to reform the industry. 
The U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed H.R. 
2420, the Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003, 
requiring funds to reveal some of the costs.194  The bill mandated disclosure 
of brokerage commission per $1,000 of assets, turnover ratios compared 
among investment companies, and soft dollar arrangements.195  In addition, 
the bill contained provisions to eliminate the late trading, market timing, 
and other abuses revealed in the scandal.196  In regards to trading costs, the 
bill required that the SEC issue a concept release examining transactions 
costs incurred by investment companies including commissions, spread, 
and market impact costs.197
The House vote took place on November 19, 2003.  On December 18, 
2003, the SEC issued a concept release in response to the House 
mandate.198  The concept release is an exemplary exploration of the issues 
 190.  Monika K. Rabarison, New Insights into Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions, 40 
J. ECON. & FIN. 492, 493 (2016).
 191.  Miles Livingston & Edward S. O’Neal, Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions, 19 
J. FIN. RESEARCH 273 (1996). 
 192.  Edelen et al., supra note 187, at 33-44.
 193.  Brokerage commissions, but not market impact costs, are disclosed in the 
Statement of Additional Information, a report of which few investors are aware.
 194.  Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003, H.R. 2420, 108th Cong. 
(2003).  H.R. 2420 passed on a vote of 418 to 2 with fourteen members not voting.  Tom 
Nohel et al., infra note 211. 
 195.  H.R. 2420 § 101(a). 
 196.  Id. § 206. 
 197.  Id. § 101(c). 
 198.  Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of Mutual Fund 
Transaction Costs, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,820, 74,821 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
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associated with mutual fund trading costs.  The release invites comments 
and states that: 
The Commission is aware of the need for transparency of mutual 
fund fees and expenses and committed to improving disclosure of 
the costs that are borne by mutual fund investors; but it is 
mindful of the complexities associated with identifying, 
measuring, and accounting for transaction costs.  Thus, the 
Commission is considering how mutual fund transaction cost 
disclosure requirements should be revised to provide more 
meaningful information to fund investors.  In particular, the 
Commission is considering whether mutual funds should be 
required among other things to (1) quantify in some meaningful 
way and disclose some or all of their portfolio transaction costs 
without including these costs in their expense ratios and fee 
tables; (2) quantify some or all transaction costs and include them 
in expense ratios and fee tables; (3) provide other quantitative 
information about the level of transaction costs, or (4) some 
combination of the above.199
The House Bill was duly passed on to the Senate Banking Committee, 
where it subsequently died.  With the death of the bill came the death of the 
SEC’s interest in disclosing trading costs of mutual funds.  Thus, it is 
impossible to argue that the SEC was, or is, unaware of the importance of 
the issue and the lack of disclosure. 
Non-disclosure of trading costs is a serious issue.  Similar to the non-
disclosure of annual expenses, it hampers investors’ ability to choose 
wisely among fund alternatives and increases the unsophisticated investor’s 
dependence on the advice of investment professionals with conflicted 
interests.  The industry and brokers who flog actively managed funds have 
good reason to mask the true costs of active management.  The annual, all-
in costs of active management generate dramatic differences in investment 
outcomes compared to passively managed funds.  Information that 
highlights these differences is an anathema to the investment management 
industry.  Average expense ratios of 1.14% and trading costs of 1.44% 
generate a total drag on returns of about 2.6% percent.200  Since low cost 
index funds are available with expense ratios in the neighborhood of ten 
basis points (0.1%), actively managed funds on average may trail passively 
managed funds by about 2.5% annually. 
Expense ratios and trading costs are not the only reasons that actively 
managed funds underperform passive management.  These numbers fail to 
take into account the substantial amounts paid in front loads for actively 
 199.  Id. at 74,821. 
 200.  Edelen et al., supra note 187. 
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managed funds, as well as greater taxes incurred by actively managed 
funds because realized gains from trading flow through to fund investors.  
In addition, actively managed funds often carry substantial cash positions 
that are a net drag on performance. 
John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard family of funds and an index 
fund pioneer, has estimated the all-in costs of actively managed mutual 
fund investing as compared to index or passive management.201  It should 
be emphasized, as Bogle does, that there is a substantial amount of 
imprecision involved in these estimates.  Bogle makes conservative 
assumptions, especially where trading costs are involved, and estimates that 
all-in costs of an actively managed tax-deferred account are 2.21 percent 
higher than an indexed account.202  These estimates ignore the relative tax 
inefficiency of actively managed funds as compared to index funds. 
Compounded over time, such differences have a dramatic impact on 
the retirement outcomes of a typical investor.  Bogle assumes a thirty-year-
old investor with a $30,000 annual salary growing at 3% per year and plans 
to retire at age seventy.203  The investor contributes 10% of his or her 
annual salary to a tax sheltered account.204  After forty years, the investor 
has accumulated $927,000 on the indexed account versus $561,000 in the 
account with actively managed funds.205  Assuming a 4% annual 
withdrawal rate, the investor in active funds could withdraw $1,870 while 
the indexed investor would receive $3,090.206
VI. FAILURE OF COMPREHENSIVE MUTUAL FUND REFORM
LEGISLATION
After extensive hearings in the Senate, Senator Peter Fitzgerald of 
Illinois introduced S. 2059, The Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004.207  The 
bill mandated clear and comprehensive fund information, eliminated 
distribution fees and soft dollar commission arrangements, and included 
provisions to deal with market timing and late trading.208  The act was 
endorsed by Vanguard founder John Bogle, who characterized the bill “‘as 
the gold standard in putting mutual fund shareholders back in the driver’s 
 201.  John C. Bogle, The Arithmetic of “All-In” Investment Expenses, 70 FIN. ANALYSTS
J. 13 (2014). 
 202.  Id. at 16. 
 203.  Id. at 17. 
 204.  Id.
 205.  Id.
 206.  Id.
 207.  Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong. §§ 210, 310, 311, 312, and 
315 (2004). 
 208.  Id.
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seat.’”209  S. 2059 had twelve co-sponsors: seven Democrats and five 
Republicans.210  Thus, Senator Fitzgerald’s bill had bi-partisan support in 
the Senate.  However, the decision to bring the bill to a vote in the Senate 
Banking Committee depended on the sole discretion of the Chairman of the 
Committee, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama.  Senator Shelby failed to 
bring S. 2059 to a vote; thus, the bill died at the end of the 108th Congress 
and along with it died the chance of comprehensive mutual fund reform.211
Senator Shelby rationalized the decision as a desire not to interfere with the 
efforts of SEC Chairman William Donaldson to reform the mutual fund 
industry.212
The website OpenSecrets.org publishes a list of the major donors for 
each member of congress, including Senator Shelby, the current and former 
Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee.213  In 2004, Senator Shelby’s 
campaign committee raised $576,183 in contributions from the Securities 
and Investment Industry.214  For 2016, the Securities and Investment 
Industry was the top industry contributor to his campaign committee, 
contributing $581,800.215
 209.  Fitzgerald Statement, supra note 149, at 2. 
 210.  See Mutual Fund Reform Act of 2004, Co-sponsors, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/senate-bill/2059/cosponsors?resultIndex=20 
[https://perma.cc/6VDC-NFQS] (listing the Senators sponsoring the bill: Sen. Levin (D-
MI); Sen. Collins (R-ME); Sen. Lugar (R-IN); Sen. Kennedy (D-MA); Sen. Hollings (D-
SC); Sen. Lautenberg (D-NJ); Sen. Durbin (D-IL); Sen. Voinovich (R-OH); Sen. Coleman 
(R-MN); Sen. Cantwell (D-WA); Sen. McCain (R-AZ); Sen. Pryor (D-AR)).  
 211.  Tom Nohel et al., Side-by-Side Management of Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds, 
23 REV. FIN. STUDIES 2342, 2343 n.4 (2010); Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a 
Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund 
Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2006). 
 212.  See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds:  Donaldson, Shelby on Same Wave Length: 
SEC Able to Handle Mutual Fund Reforms, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 661 (2004)
(quoting Senate Banking Chairman Richard Shelby’s statement that the SEC is “showing a 
lot of leadership and resolve. . . . We don’t want to do anything that would be construed in 
any way as undermining what the SEC is doing.”).  SEC Chairman William Donaldson was 
co-founder and served as Chairman and CEO of the investment banking firm Donaldson, 
Lufkin & Jenrette.  SEC Biography: Chairman William H. Donaldson, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/donaldson.htm
[https://perma.cc/9ABV-RNNS].
 213.  Sen. Richard C. Shelby, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
politicians/summary.php?cid=N00009920&cycle=2016#cont [https://perma.cc/KW28-
J2BH].
 214.  Sen. Richard C. Shelby, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
politicians/summary.php?cycle=2004&type=I&cid=N00009920&newMem=N#cont 
[https://perma.cc/98CU-Y57F]. 
 215.  Sen. Richard C. Shelby, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
politicians/summary.php?cycle=2016&type=I&cid=N00009920&newMem=N#cont 
[https://perma.cc/9R57-TV8N]. 
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It is impossible to know how much of an influence the investment 
management industry had on Senator Shelby’s decision.  What is clear is 
that because of large political contributions, the industry had a seat at the 
table and its voice was clearly heard.  What is not so clear is why the 
interests of the investing public were ignored. 
The investment management industry is adept at pulling the right 
levers to influence the political and regulatory process and, as demonstrated 
above, has done so repeatedly in regard to advisory and distribution fees 
and soft dollar commissions.  The failure of comprehensive mutual fund 
reform in 2004 is yet another and recent example of broad regulatory 
capture.
VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Mutual funds are especially vulnerable to regulatory capture.  Massive 
amounts of wealth are involved, the product is complex, and consumers are 
largely financially illiterate and under-informed.  A relatively small number 
of fund sponsors are able to reap huge profits by overcharging a large 
number of consumers by small amounts each year.  Because of 
compounding, the small increments of excess and often undisclosed costs 
have a large impact on the terminal value of mutual fund investments.  
Fund sponsors are thus incentivized to capture the regulators, and there are 
few incentives for consumers or consumer advocacy groups to respond.  
The Investment Management Industry has effectively captured the SEC and 
influential members of Congress. 
The ultimate aim of the investment management industry was and is to 
influence regulation to enhance the profits accruing to the owners of the 
investment management firms.  Each of the examples of broad and narrow 
regulatory capture illustrated directly or indirectly enhances the profits of 
those shareholders at the expense of mutual fund shareholders. 
Advisory fees are too high because mutual funds are captives of the 
investment management firms that create and manage them.  The industry 
successfully influenced Congress to neutralize the SEC in regard to such 
fees when the 1970 amendment to the Investment Company Act of 1940 
was passed.  Perhaps the single most significant action the SEC could do to 
help mutual fund investors would be to ignore the wording in the Senate 
Report accompanying the 1970 Act and use its standing to sue.  It could 
and should pick one of the largest fund complexes with egregiously high 
fees and litigate an excessive fee case to its conclusion.  The resultant 
precedent could lower advisory fees to the range of fees actually 
determined by arm’s length bargaining and save mutual fund investors 
billions each year. 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 119 S
ide B
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 119 Side B      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
5_BROWN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:35 PM
748 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 19:3 
This paper highlights the true nature of mutual fund distribution fees.  
The SEC was manipulated into imposing marketing fees on the assets of 
mutual fund shareholders.  Marketing fees should properly be borne by the 
investment management firms that benefit from the increased level of fund 
assets.  The SEC’s continued refusal to rein in CDSC abuses is a disgrace.  
Mutual fund shareholders continue to be improperly charged billions each 
year.  The SEC has within its authority to rescind Rule 12-1 and should do 
so immediately. 
The SEC should also do everything in its power to minimize the 
impact of soft dollar commissions.  Commissions at above-market rates 
currently finance research costs and other items that are properly expenses 
of investment management firms.  Mutual fund shareholders are 
overcharged hundreds of millions of dollars per year in above-market 
commission rates, and this should cease.  At a minimum, the SEC should 
immediately require full disclosure of all soft dollar arrangement by mutual 
fund investment management companies. 
The SEC should require investment management firms to periodically 
disclose the dollar level of fees imposed on each shareholder of each 
mutual fund.  In addition, estimates of trading costs including commissions, 
bids-ask spreads, and market impact should be included.  The SEC’s 
behavior in regard to cost disclosure is unconscionable. 
The cumulative effect of the capture of the SEC is that the mutual 
fund investment management industry is hugely profitable.  The universe 
of publicly traded fund sponsors is extraordinarily profitable and fund 
sponsors earn economic profits for their owners.216
In summary, this paper demonstrates that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has been captured in both a broad and narrow context.  In a 
broad sense, politicians have directly enabled the industry to siphon off 
billions in excess advisory and distribution fees and soft dollar 
commissions.  In a narrow sense, the SEC has refused to reform 
distribution fees and has slow walked disclosure of fees and trading costs. 
Professor Freeman’s comments in the context of distribution fees aptly 
summarize the role of the SEC in the overall regulation of mutual funds: 
After more than 60 years of intensive government regulation, we 
find the load mutual fund business sporting a dysfunctional 
governance model grounded on conflicts of interest, and a 
haphazard, costly distribution system where false labeling of 
expense items is rampant.  The system is built on disproved 
hypotheses, hidden payoffs, and deceptive marketing ploys.  
 216.  Stewart L. Brown, Gartenberg: Some Empirical Clarity 32 (June 9, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616347, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2616347, or 
https://perma.cc/4RKQ-BJ3W. 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 120 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 120 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
5_BROWN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:35 PM
2017]MUTUAL FUNDS AND THE REGULATORY CAPTURE OF THE SEC 749 
Watching over it is a federal agency that functions more as the 
fund managers’ crony than as a defender of the public good. . . . 
[A]ny change for the better for fund shareholders is not apt to 
come from the politically-influenced agency that ostensibly 
regulates the investment management industry.217
Senator Peter Fitzgerald’s comments are especially cogent: “The 
mutual fund industry is now the world’s largest skimming operation—a $7-
trillion trough from which fund managers, brokers and other insiders are 
steadily siphoning off an excessive slice of the Nation’s household, college, 
and retirement savings.”218
Since Senator Fitzgerald made his comments, mutual fund assets have 
more than doubled and the skimming and siphoning continues unabated.  
Individual investors are being systematically under-informed and 
overcharged billions and the Congress and SEC are complicit.  In plain 
language, the ultimate cause of this disgraceful situation is the corruption 
of our institutions. 
 217.  Freeman, supra note 38, at 831. 
 218.  Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing Before 
the Fin. Mgmt., The Budget, & Int’l Sec. Subcomms. of the S. Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald).  
